

Current History

DECEMBER, 1961

FOR READING TODAY . . . FOR REFERENCE TOMORROW

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Coming Next Month...

FOREIGN POLICY OF THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION

January, 1962

Our January issue is a study of the Kennedy administration during its first year in office. In this issue seven contributors analyze and evaluate the effectiveness of the new United States policies in the following articles:

UNITED STATES-SOVIET TENSIONS by *Julian Towster*, Professor of Political Science, University of California, and author of "Political Power in the U.S.S.R.";

KENNEDY AND AFRICAN NATIONALISM by *Rayford W. Logan*, Head, History Department, Howard University, and author of "The African Mandates in World Politics";

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UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN AND PEKING by *Norman A. Graebner*, Professor of History, University of Illinois, and author of "The New Isolationism";

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD LAOS by *Bernard Fall*, Associate Professor of Government, Howard University, and author of "Street Without Joy: Indochina at War 1946-1954."

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Current History

Vol. 41

DECEMBER, 1961

No. 244

The December issue of CURRENT HISTORY focuses on the nations of South and Southeast Asia, and their increasing significance for the world power struggle. Our first article discusses the problem of Formosa and the two Chinas. "In the great councils of the Allied Powers, where Formosa's fate is determined, the wishes of Formosans have received little attention." This writer concludes that "the island's fate will be decided not on the basis of legal or historical arguments, but on political grounds. . . ."

Formosa and "The China Issue"

By WERNER LEVI

Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota

FOR OVER A DECADE now it has been difficult in the United States to discuss "The China Issue" rationally. How can we evaluate American policy toward China? The answer is prejudged because of its deep involvement in domestic politics. Even if they accept prevailing views, few political leaders are willing to risk their positions by an objective statement of possible alternatives.

The unanimous resolution in the Senate during the summer of 1961, opposing United Nations representation for Communist China and American recognition of the Communist Government, was typical. The United States position on Communist and Nationalist China has become a national creed and can hardly be called a policy. It originated in the naive and risky view that some evil men in Washington were responsible for the trouble in China and that non-recognition of the Communists was its solution. For that matter, it is equally simple-minded to assume that recognition would prove to be the panacea.

The requirements of the national interest or the suitability of the means to fulfil it have been forgotten in the shallowness and partisanship of the debate. Who sold China

down the river? With the search for the guilty party concentrated on some officials in the State Department, the preposterous notion became firmly embedded in the American public mind that it was within the power of the United States to choose a political and social system for five or six hundred million Chinese with thousands of years of history behind them. The public discussion focused on the past; its nature guaranteed that it would produce few constructive conclusions for the future shape of America's China policy.

There has been no awareness that some misfortunes of American policy in Asia could be related to the sterility of America's policy toward China. Even on the basis of its own assumptions the "containment" policy has never been thoroughly developed in all its ramifications. Is the United States, for instance, willing to make containment effective by preventing Japan from trading with Communist China and compensating the Japanese with alternative outlets for their goods in the American market? Is the United States prepared to fight a war, as she was in regard to Berlin, if the independence of South Vietnam or Thailand is in jeopardy? How can the tough stand on encircled Berlin

be justified when Laos is abandoned because of inaccessibility?

Policy toward China is obviously only part of policy in a wider area. The question of her representation in the United Nations or the recognition of the Communist Government cannot be put or answered out of context and for all eternity. It must be related to world politics and even more to American national interests, whose nature and realization change with men and times. No state can ignore the warning of a British statesman centuries ago that Great Britain had neither permanent friends nor permanent enemies, but only permanent interests. Nor can American interests in the China issue be defined in moral terms alone on the basis of eternally valid moral principles because the nation-state system is not run on such principles.

Where moral considerations and the preservation of the national interests deviate, adjustments become necessary, regrettably, and the history of all modern nations shows that these have usually taken place at the expense of morality. In regard to Formosa, this approach to the evaluation of interests and the formulation of policy requires an examination of the domestic situation in Formosa, the place of the island in the world of nations, and, after careful attention to these two factors, its meaning for the United States.

Prosperous Formosa

The outstanding feature of Formosa is its economic well being. The island, compared to several other Asian countries, was fortunate in having a headstart. It is liberally endowed by nature, and during the 50 years of Japanese rule after 1895 its potentialities were well developed, with considerable benefit to its inhabitants. For a few years after the war, conditions reached a low ebb under Chinese Nationalist mismanagement.

Since 1949, with the establishment of the National Government on the island, a remarkable improvement has taken place for a number of reasons. There was a good deal of soul-searching among the Nationalist leaders. In contrast to the behavior of their friends in the United States, they admitted frankly that their inefficiency, corruption and neglect of the people's welfare contrib-

buted to the disaster on the mainland. They resolved therefore to do better on Formosa. There was, secondly, a political necessity: to appeal to the people on the mainland. Finally, American aid has been flowing into the island to an amount of about \$3.5 billion (by 1960), of which \$2.5 billion was for military aid. Equally important: with American money came American technical aid and pressure for the betterment of political, economic and social conditions.

The government undertook important land reforms and some political reforms. It instituted legal and technical changes and stimulated the growth of mining industries and the development of secondary light industries. The gross national product has increased appreciably and is rising at a high rate annually, perhaps as much as six per cent. Land tenancy and indebtedness have been reduced so that more than 80 per cent of farm families own all or much of their land. In addition, successful efforts were made to improve their social welfare. In the light of these developments, the government's efforts to attract foreign investments are beginning to be successful. But whether the goal of the third four-year-plan, to be independent of American aid by 1964, can be reached is extremely doubtful. There are social and political problems, partly resulting from the economic improvements, which interfere and which cannot be solved so quickly.

The population of the island is growing at a very rapid rate, balancing and in some respects outrunning economic progress. The National Government, wanting manpower, is opposed to birth control. In a few years, it is estimated that Formosa, instead of exporting, will have to import rice and several other commodities in which it is now self-sufficient. Many young men, especially those with higher education, will become increasingly misemployed or altogether unemployed—unless they are absorbed by the army and will then represent a burden on the economy.

The Military Burden

This army of about half a million men is obviously too large for what would under normal conditions be the need of an island like Formosa. The National Government

maintains it with a view to a reconquest of the mainland and the economy has to support what American aid does not supply. An exorbitantly large number of generals and admirals is maintained, whose contribution to the island economy is nil or negative. A similar situation prevails with regard to the National Government, which exists above the provincial government of Formosa. In relation to its present functions, it is vastly oversized and its only reason for existing is to be available after the return to the mainland. Thus, a good many under-employed politicians and bureaucrats join the generals and admirals, forming a large segment of the island's ruling class.

They are not a happy lot. Their living standards, compared to their former conditions on the mainland, have gone down, while those of the Formosans in general have gone up. Many of them are aware of the futility of their existence. Many live on the hope, if not pretense, of a return to the mainland. They are impatient and resentful. They are jealously guarding their élite positions, fighting a losing battle (in the long run) against the emerging Formosans.

Notwithstanding efforts by the National Government to keep the Formosans in their subordinate role as provincials, literally and figuratively, the island's natives are improving their positions. This is not yet so true in the political field. There the National Government finds it easiest to repress any aspirations by keeping Formosans out of the still exclusive Kuomintang party and out of policy-making positions above the local level, while at the same time suppressing attempts to form opposition parties or express unauthorized opinions.

It is true, though, in other ways. Formosans have economically benefited from governmental efforts and American aid. More important, contacts with Americans have strengthened their social position and influence. The Nationalist army, originally almost entirely composed of mainlanders, had to recruit increasing numbers of Formosans to bring the average age down to 25 years, in conformity with the "Forward Look Plan" of modernization. Some of these Formosans have obtained officer status. As the Formosan participation in the army grows, its enthusiasm for the liberation of

the mainland may diminish in favor of the island's defense, and conceivably it may assist in the political emancipation of the Formosans.

In the process of acculturation and assimilation now going on in Formosa, the Formosans have a great advantage in their numerical strength. There are about eight million Formosans and two million Chinese from the mainland. But until that process is nearer completion at some future date, there is tension between the two groups making the Chinese more determined to maintain their political predominance and the Formosans to get rid of it.

The Lei Chen case in the fall of 1960 highlighted both the repressive Chinese policy against the Formosans and the general nature of the National Government's regime. Mr. Lei Chen is a refugee from the mainland whose anti-Communist inclinations are well established in everyone's mind except the members of the National Government. He was about to create an anti-Communist party in opposition to the Kuomintang when he was accused of sedition. The cursory nature of the trial and the suppression of its free discussion in Formosa ruled out any check on the accuracy of the charges. Mr. Chen was condemned to ten years imprisonment and his party and paper were forbidden.

Apart from Mr. Chen himself, all the members of the organizing committee of the party were Formosans and its support came largely from those dissatisfied with the inadequate representation of Formosans in the government. Presumably to undo some of the bad impression this case created among free Chinese everywhere, the election of a Formosan as President of the Legislative Yuan was celebrated with great fanfare, emphasizing thereby the unusual nature of such an occurrence.

Formosan Resistance

This kind of treatment encouraged Formosan nationalists in their agitation for political independence. The Formosans never accepted Chinese or Japanese rule without rebellion. The Chinese, until 1895, had to contend with regular and numerous uprisings throughout the two centuries of their domination. The 50 years of Japanese

rule were riddled with 15 uprisings. When the Chinese took over again after 1945, they dealt with a major revolt in 1947 in such a ruthless and cruel fashion that even Chiang K'ai-shek found it necessary to change provincial governors in an attempt to appease the population. He found it impossible, however, to uproot the movement for independence altogether.

While there is no chance for organized resistance in Formosa, a good deal of plotting by Formosan nationalists is going on in Tokyo and others propagate their ideas wherever they can, including the United States. The Formosan Democratic Independence party is the official vehicle of the movement. The Chinese belittle it as completely insignificant, while the leader of the party claims 3000 members in Tokyo alone. Its aim is a plebiscite under American or United Nations auspices to determine the future status of the island either as a trusteeship or as an independent, neutral state.

In the great councils of the Allied Powers where Formosa's fate is determined, the wishes of the Formosans have received little attention. The Nationalist and Communist Chinese are agreed on the one point: that Formosa belongs to China. They have full support from the Communist nations. The Japanese admit freely that Formosa no longer belongs to them. The British view is that the status of Formosa remains to be defined. Many Asian states do not deny certain Chinese claims, but consider that the best solution of the problem would be to follow the wishes of the Formosans. The Ceylonese government suggested therefore a conference of certain Asian states in 1955 to work out plans for a trusteeship of independent status, but nothing came of this proposal.

When, in 1945, the United States turned Formosa's administration over to the National Government, it could be assumed that the United States considered the island Chinese territory. But many official statements resulting from the Korean war and the fighting over the offshore islands contained enough ambiguity to make it uncertain just what the position of the United States is at this time. As a consequence, all concerned, the Chinese Communists, the

Nationalists, and the Formosans, are unhappy with American policy.


This variety of views on Formosa's status indicates an uncertain legal position, with the possibility of every government defining it according to its own political preferences. Under the Cairo Declaration of 1943 it was determined "that all territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China." In the Peace Treaty with Japan, that country renounced sovereignty over the island. But whatever conclusions may be drawn from these documents, the Formosans argue, can be undone by the disposition in article 103 of the United Nations Charter that obligations under the Charter shall prevail over conflicting treaty agreements.

The historical argument, never very convincing anyway, because there is usually the possibility of going back to that point in history which fits the argument, is not much more helpful. Formosa was independent before the seventh century. It then was settled by Chinese and was formally incorporated into the Empire in 1682. But before that incorporation, Formosa also had Spanish settlers and was dominated between 1624 and 1661 by the Dutch. While Formosa was part of the Chinese Empire, the Chinese government made no particular efforts to assimilate the island or to take responsibility for its population. As a result, the Japanese gradually took over in the last part of the nineteenth century and formally annexed the island in 1895, following China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese war. Historically, therefore, the Formosans, the Dutch, the Chinese and the Japanese could support some claims to the island.

Yet it is clear that the island's fate will be decided not on the basis of legal and historical arguments, but on political grounds, or, more especially, according to changing attitudes toward the Nationalist and Communist regimes. In this respect, the trend in the last 10 years has been away from the wholehearted American support of the Nationalists, making the international position of the National Government increasingly precarious.

The vote in the United Nations relating to the seating of the Communist Government's

SOUTHERN AND EASTERN ASIA



representative has been ever more unfavorable for the National Government. On October 8, 1960, it reached the very dangerous figure of 42 to 34, with 22 abstentions, in favor of postponing discussion of the seating of China's representative. There was a time when 85 per cent of those voting yes or no favored the United States position. In 1960 only 56 per cent did so. Twelve of the sixteen new African states were among the abstainers. But several made it known that they abstained only in order not to antagonize the United States so early in their new national careers and that they favored the seating of the Communist Government's representative. It would, however, be erroneous to ascribe the changing vote merely to the increase in membership through nations with neutralist or Communist inclinations. Among the abstainers and those voting for discussion could be found states which had formerly been opposed to Communist representation.

Changing Attitudes toward Red China

The changing views of such close allies of the United States as Great Britain and Japan indicated a fundamental trend based on serious doubt of the continued wisdom of American policy and on a growing need for contact with Communist China. During 1960 and 1961, high British officials talked freely about the necessity of seating the Communists in the United Nations as the proper representatives of China. They based their view primarily on the impossibility of discussing international problems effectively without the participation of the Communists. The Japanese, who have been pressing for closer relations with Communist China for many years, have in many cases become impatient with the American position. Prime Minister Ikeda announced in February, 1961, that his country would seek better relations with China, economically as well as diplomatically, because the world had reached "a decisive turning point" and better understanding between East and West had become a vital necessity. He admitted frankly, after his visit to Washington in the summer of 1961, that United States and Japanese sentiments toward Formosa were not the same. These Japanese feelings have been implemented by increasing trade with

the mainland, growing activities of Japanese businessmen there, and exchanges of good will missions of various kinds with significant political implications.

In view of these trends, American officials began to warn their public that the possibility of Chinese Communist representation in the United Nations must be faced. A search began for alternative tactics to keep Communist representation out of the United Nations; otherwise the use of the veto or parliamentary maneuvers would become the only, very unimpressive way to do so. The alternatives all seemed to turn around the attempt to attach conditions to the seating of the Communists which would appear reasonable to the world but unacceptable to the Chinese; in the hope, of course, that Chinese obnoxiousness, not American policy, would appear to keep the Communists out.

The National Government is equally unhappy with changing policies of other states and American attempts to circumvent their effects. Its position is one of rigid and absolute opposition to anything which might result in any concession of any kind to the Communists in China, Korea, Laos, Vietnam or anywhere, even at the risk of war. The very recent American endeavor to find different means, more adapted to changing world politics, to reach unchanged goals has been enough to lead to a deterioration of relations between Washington and Taipei. The Chinese vehemently denounced what they described as the softening of the American Government toward the Communist Government.

The Nationalists' propaganda machine in the United States has gone into high gear, accusing the American government of refusing "to fight for justice."

Specifically, the "Two China Policy"—the recognition of Nationalist and Communist China simultaneously—and the "Successor State Theory"—that Communist China is the legitimate heir to the rights and obligations of Nationalist China—are condemned as unacceptable, unjustifiable and abominable. The idea of recognizing Outer Mongolia as an independent state is decried as surrender and as useless because no listening post is needed there to discover Russian-Chinese tensions nor would it stop the Russians from proceeding with atomic tests.

The search for different tactics to achieve the exclusion of Communist representation in the United Nations is branded as a disguised invitation to the Communists to enter. The visit of Formosa's Prime Minister Ch'en Ch'eng to Washington in the summer of 1961 to align American policy with that of the National Government has not been entirely successful.

Under the combined pressure from the United States and a number of African states, the National Government did not use its veto in the Security Council to prevent the admission of Outer Mongolia into the United Nations. This pleased the African states, because it permitted the admission also of Mauritania as a new member—which the Soviet Union would have vetoed had Outer Mongolia not been admitted simultaneously. As a token of their gratitude, the African states withdrew their threat to vote in favor of Communist China as the proper occupant of the Chinese seat in the United Nations, thereby permitting additional maneuvering in the United Nations to postpone any decision on the seating of Communist China for another year.

In other parts of the world, the National Government is trying to win friends by the supply of technical aid and the exchange of visits. Chinese experts in agriculture, industrialization, fishing, canning and other fields can be found in several countries of Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. The government has about 11 diplomatic missions in Africa and is trying to strengthen older diplomatic ties in Latin America. The hope for votes from these states in the United Nations is undoubtedly one motive behind these activities. They can, however, carry little weight in the decisions of these states. More telling are the facts that not one among the decreasing number of states voting with the United States or having diplomatic relations with the National Government has committed itself to the defense of Formosa or has given either economic or military aid, and that some of them have very distinctly dissociated themselves from any defensive measures by Nationalist China or the United States in behalf of the off-shore islands.

This stand by the rest of the world on the China issue should be of considerable interest

in the formulation of American policy. It weakens the American argument for an adamant stand against the seating of Communist China in the United Nations or the recognition of her government because such measures would create doubt in the free world about the American determination to fight communism. It becomes, on the contrary, increasingly clear that the building up of these measures as a symbol of anti-communism is of American making and convincing mostly to Americans. Any change in that policy would presumably shock the American more than any other, especially the Asian, public.

The Moral Issue

This leaves unanswered the moral question of protecting the ten million people on Formosa. It is a moral question not because the Nationalists "stuck by" the United States, for they did so in their own interest and exacted a price for it, but because it is a matter of principle for the United States. This duty to itself, the American people can fulfil without supporting the National Government in all its political ambitions, especially when these are based on the unrealistic assumption of a liberation of the mainland. The United States is entitled to demand as much realism from her allies as she must apply to the evaluation of her own interests and policies. The Communist Government appears to be firmly enough in control so that an overthrow could only come from within, with little contribution from Formosa. It is, furthermore, unlikely that any opposition to the Communist regime on the mainland could doubt fundamental American opposition to the Communists and could be discouraged by flexibility in American tactics and strategy.

American interests in East Asia do not parallel those of the Chinese Nationalists. When they are reexamined in the light of changing circumstances, the cogency of the argument originally leading to the rigid American position becomes subject to doubt. What America's interests are, and even more how they should be protected, is by no means so certain as State Department pronouncements or congressional resolutions assume. It could well be that, as time goes on, alternative actions would be advisable.

China's "Containment"

China's "containment through isolation" can in its totality remain effective only with the cooperation of United States' friends and allies. To the extent that this is decreasing, the effectiveness of the policy has suffered severely. It has failed to prevent the growth of China's power. In the realm of trade it has robbed the United States of any bargaining power she might have had before other states became able and willing to supply what earlier only the United States could have supplied. Military containment, never entirely feasible around China's periphery anyway, may be important only to keep Formosa out of Chinese hands. Even this necessity will disappear as China acquires the most modern weapons.

Political isolation deprives the free world of any pressure that might be exerted in international councils upon Communist China and eliminates the possibility of useful and even necessary diplomatic contacts. Any accretion of prestige through Communist China's seating in the United Nations is not likely to be greater than the prestige now accruing to National China. The exclusion of Communist China's representative from the United Nations on the grounds of past and present political performance, while in accord with high moral considerations, can nevertheless be justified only by the application of a double standard when the nature and behavior of some states which are members of the world organization are examined. It is not a convincing argument.

Altogether, the question of seating the Chinese Communists in the United Nations has assumed an importance in American eyes out of proportion to its inherent sig-

nificance. To a lesser extent, this is true also of American recognition. These measures, one way or the other, do not resolve the complexity of America's relations with the two China's and they are certainly no substitute for an imaginative policy toward Asia in general, within whose framework alone the China problem can be solved. The rigidity of American policy has prevented a serious examination of the containment policy in the light of changes in the military, economic and political situations as they affect American interests, including specifically variations of Peking's relations with Moscow, New Delhi and other Asian capitals or, for that matter, Taipei's relations with other states, since the inauguration of the American policy.

Very few of the well-known arguments leading to the containment policy or of the counter-arguments mentioned above have eternal validity. The same applies therefore to the measures based upon them. Flexibility, much feared by the National Government, does not mean surrender or even appeasement. It merely means policy adjustment to changing conditions from the standpoint of relatively fixed national interests. It might involve measures which look more unfavorable from Taipei than Washington; if so it will be due to inevitably differing interests.

In the long run, it will become necessary for the United States to explore and probe the possibility of peaceful coexistence with Communist China; a possibility which is *a priori* unacceptable to Nationalist China, while it may only be repugnant to most Americans. Such exploration requires that the American people and government overcome the emotional bloc they have developed on the China issue and the mental laziness and lack of imagination to which the oversimplified policy of "containment" has catered so beautifully. Change becomes inevitable once Communist China's representative is seated in the United Nations and the United States is obliged to respond to Chinese measures. This may require concessions, but will also provide the opportunity to force Communist China into a diplomatic defensive or more acceptable international behavior.

Werner Levi's writing is well known to *Current History* readers. He has traveled and lectured on several occasions since World War II in India, Siam, Malaya and Australia and, in the summer of 1961, in Hawaii. His books include *Free India in Asia*, *Modern China's Foreign Policy*, and most recently, *Australia's Outlook on Asia*.

At home, "the Sukarno regime has survived enormous economic difficulties and a large-scale rebellion. . . . Sukarno still has a hypnotic power over the masses." Abroad, "Indonesia follows a foreign policy of neutralism . . . heavily weighted in favor of the Communist bloc."

“Guided Democracy” in Indonesia

By AMRY VANDENBOSCH

*Director, Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce,
University of Kentucky*

THE FIRST 12 years of Indonesian independence have not been marked by political or economic progress. Politically the years have been hectic; economically they have brought little but suffering. Political stability has eluded the Indonesian people from the beginning. Economic prosperity they enjoyed for a few years, due to the brisk demand which the Korean hostilities created for rubber, oil and tin—Indonesia's chief export commodities—but since 1953 production has not kept pace with the increase of population, and in many cases has actually declined. The political and economic deterioration which began so early has never been more than momentarily arrested. The country is now in a desperate plight.

When the Netherlands transferred sovereignty over the large, populous, insular territory on December 27, 1949, the Dutch had not been in effective control over the entire country for eight years. Much had happened during that time. The Japanese invasion, followed by three and a half years of hostile occupation, followed in turn by four years of revolution, had set the country back immeasurably. A politically mature people would have found the situation difficult; the politically immature and administratively inexperienced Indonesians have not been able to come to grips with their basic problems. The Dutch had done little to prepare them for running their own affairs. The facilities offered for intermediate and higher education were meager; few Indonesians had been appointed to important administrative positions; and institutions for self-government were tardily developed.

On the economic side, however, the inheritance was by no means all bad. With respect to trade, the Netherlands followed an open-door policy. Goods entering Indonesia from the Netherlands paid the same duty as goods from other countries, and Indonesian goods entering the Netherlands enjoyed no preference over goods from other countries. By contrast, in the neighboring Philippines there were 100 per cent preferences for American goods and Philippine products enjoyed a similar advantage on the American market. Because of this arrangement of “free trade” between the two countries (which meant the “closed door” for the trade of other countries), the Philippine economy has had to undergo a long and

Amry Vandenbosch was a member of the Brookhaven Nuclear Scientists' mission to the Colombo Plan countries in 1956 and a member of the Secretariat at the San Francisco Conference in 1945, where he served as one of the secretaries of the trusteeship committee. A long-time student of colonial policy and administration in Southeast Asia, his books include *The Dutch East Indies: Its Government, Problems and Politics*; *The United Nations* (co-authored); and *Southeast Asia among the Powers*, with Richard Butwell. His latest book is *Dutch Foreign Policy since 1815: A Study in Small Power Politics* (1959).

painful period of adjustment since independence.

Indonesia had no such problem. Furthermore, thanks to the Dutch policy of prohibiting the sale of land to non-indigenous persons, the Indonesians owned all the land within the country's borders. There was no large-scale foreign ownership of land as in many dependencies and underdeveloped countries. In spite of this protection of the native in land ownership the Dutch were able to induce Western entrepreneurs to invest large amounts of capital in the agricultural industry of the country. Most of the Western enterprises were very productive. And lastly, the government owned and operated not only public utilities but also mines, and even some plantations. In pre-war days from 16 to 30 per cent of the total income of the central government came from the government monopolies, products and industries. The Indonesian government fell heir to these valuable assets.

Economic Policy and Conditions

Not all of Indonesia's economic difficulties were of her own making, but many of them were. Some measures, taken for political reasons, had serious economic consequences. The large increase of government employees was understandable politically, but economically it was bad. Increased expenditures for education and social welfare were inevitable, in view of the lively expectations aroused during the national revolution. Social, especially labor, legislation was enacted which would have been appropriate only for an advanced economy. From the beginning the new government was plagued with internal insecurity. Unwise governmental policies provoked the 1958 rebellion, which brought with it further interference with production and increased military expenditures.

In the long struggle for national independence the Indonesian leaders quite naturally developed a strong bias against foreign capital; by the time they came to power, this had become a strong antipathy towards all capitalism, foreign or national. The national program called for greatly increased public expenditures, which only a rapidly expanding economy could sustain, but the government did little to encourage

entrepreneurs, foreign or Indonesian, and did many things to dishearten them. The economic base has expanded little, if it has not contracted, while the population is increasing by more than two million each year.

Antipathy to Capitalism

The first practical test of the government's attitude towards foreign property and its ability to protect it came in 1953. Squatters had occupied large areas of land on the east coast of Sumatra which had been leased to foreign corporations and individuals. By 1953 some 62,000 families had squatted on these lands, mostly tobacco plantations. A compromise agreement between the government and the foreign lessees had been reached in 1951; the latter agreed to give up 130,000 of their 255,000 hectares of concession lands in return for a new 30-year lease for the remaining 125,000 acres, while the former undertook to remove the squatters on the land retained by the lessees and resettle them. Little was done to carry out the decision. When the Wilopo government in the early months of 1953 seriously attempted to remove the squatters a disorder broke out in which five demonstrators were killed. The Wilopo government, which had instituted a number of administrative and fiscal reforms and sought to follow sound economic policies, was already under severe political pressure when this incident occurred. Attacks on the Cabinet now became so bitter that it resigned (June, 1953).

Parliament had proved unwilling and the government was unable to remove the old squatters or to prevent new ones from taking over more of the leased lands. The Wilopo cabinet faced a somewhat similar problem with respect to some oil wells of the Batavian Oil Company, a subsidiary of the Royal Dutch Shell. The wells had been taken over by the revolutionists and in 1953 they were operating under a government board, producing at only about two per cent of their prewar output. With the object of restoring full production, of obtaining increased revenue and of assuring foreign capital that it would receive fair treatment in Indonesia, the Wilopo government wanted to return the wells to the Royal Dutch Shell, but a large section of Parliament demanded im-

mediate nationalization. Faced with this pressure the government neither returned the wells nor proceeded with nationalization.

From this time on the movement was to the Left and the atmosphere steadily became more hostile, first to foreign capital and then to domestic capitalism as well. In 1956, the Indonesian government repudiated the debts to the Netherlands which it had assumed in the Agreements which sealed the transfer of sovereignty to the new republic. In 1957 the property of Dutch nationals was virtually confiscated, thousands of Netherlanders were expelled, and the Dutch merchant fleet which supplied the inter-island shipping was summarily driven out. These measures deeply shocked the economy of the country. Though they were retaliation for the Netherlands' refusal to hand West New Guinea over to Indonesia, these hostile acts had a significance which extended beyond Dutch-Indonesian relations. They indicated a general hostility to foreign capital. When a plausible excuse presents itself, action against other foreign enterprises will occasion no surprise. In March, 1961, the government took over Belgian agricultural estates for their "protection," on the ground that popular feeling against Belgium was running high as a result of events in the Congo and there was danger of violence. Regulations for sweeping land reforms were announced in January, 1961. They do not apply to foreign-owned concessions but the climate created by these reforms is bound to influence their position.

The foreign oil companies operating in Indonesia have been accorded favorable treatment, and oil production has increased markedly—the one bright spot in the production and export picture. However, their turn may have come. In October, 1960, President Sukarno signed a decree declaring oil and gas extraction a monopoly of the government. It is unlikely that the oil companies will be forced out entirely; it is more probable that they will be pressed to exchange their concessions for contracts to serve as operating agencies of the government and to accept restrictions on the free-

dom they now enjoy of using their own export credits as they wish.

Continual labor troubles and innumerable vexatious government regulations—the dominant feature of the policy of "guided economy"—have added to the difficulties of business enterprises. It is small wonder that the foreign businesses have tried to save what they can by maximizing profits and making no further reinvestments. The result is a severe decline in estate crops. Production (in weight) in 1958 was much below that of 1940. Cane sugar production declined by 50 per cent, rubber by 15, coffee by 70, tea by 30, cinchona bark by 70, palm oil by nearly 40 and tobacco by nearly 20 per cent.¹ This decline in production was not limited to estate crops. The output of coal in 1958 was only one-third of what it was in 1940 and of tin only about three-fifths. Exports of certain commodities in 1960 in terms of the volume of 1953 were as follows: rubber, 78 per cent; tin, 77 per cent; coconut products, 59 per cent; petroleum, 143 per cent.²

Netherlanders were not the only foreigners to suffer from hostile measures. Many National (Formosan) Chinese were seriously affected by the Indonesian government's seizure of their assets in 1958 and all Chinese were badly hurt by a decree prohibiting aliens from engaging in retail shop-keeping in rural areas after December 31, 1959. The Communist Chinese government bitterly protested the second measure. Many thousands of Chinese returned home. These measures may have furthered the object of Indonesianizing the economy, but they also set it back and caused hardship for the native peasants.

While the economy grew little or not at all, governmental expenditures steadily increased, with ever greater budgetary deficits, producing an inflationary spiral. The Bank of Indonesia's claims on the government increased from 5 billion rupiahs in 1952 to 34 billion in 1959. The official exchange rate jumped from 3.80 rupiahs to the dollar (U. S.) in 1950 to 11.40 in 1952 and to 45 in 1959, but at the end of 1959 the black market rate was 240 rupiahs to the dollar. Inflation brought with it a vicious circle. Smuggling commodities out of the country and selling them in Malaya and North

¹ *Statistical Pocketbook of Indonesia*, 1959, published by the Central Bureau of Statistics, Djakarta, p. 68.

² *International Financial Statistics*, published by the International Monetary Fund., Volume XIV, No. 8, Washington, August, 1961.

Borneo at the world price for hard currency has become a temptation which many can not resist. The government loses foreign exchange and export duties.

In an effort to check the inflationary spiral the government in August, 1959, resorted to a sudden drastic devaluation and freezing of assets. All 500 and 1,000 rupiah bank notes were cut to 10 per cent of their face value and 90 per cent of all bank deposits over 25,000 were frozen. This drastic measure reduced the money in circulation by 8 billion rupiahs, but without much effect. At the end of the year the amount of money in circulation was as large as it was before the devaluation. Such a rigorous measure naturally produced some ill effects. Suddenly deprived of a large part of their operating capital, business enterprises, especially the smaller ones, were seriously crippled. The government had to come to their aid. What it had taken away with one hand it had to return with the other.

From Federalism to Military Government

Indonesia began as a federal republic. The Indonesians among themselves had agreed upon the federal constitution before going to the Round Table Conference at the Hague at which the agreements for the transfer of sovereignty were worked out. The federal constitution was unpopular, chiefly because 16 of the 17 states which composed the federation had been created by the Dutch. Unfortunately, the change to a unitary government was made irresponsibly. Instead of grappling at once with the numerous problems confronting them, the Indonesian political leaders spent their time maneuvering to replace the federal with a unitary constitution. They achieved their purpose, but for eight critical months the government was practically at a standstill. Moreover, it was a mistake to abolish federalism. Because of its geographic structure and ethnological composition some form of federalism is practically a necessity for Indonesia. Had federalism been retained and the constitution amended so as to make a few large island groups the component units, Indonesia might have been spared many woes.

Both the ill-fated federal government and the unitary government which replaced it

on August 17, 1950, were parliamentary in form, but hardly democratic, since most members of parliament had not been elected by popular vote and Sukarno had been chosen president in 1945 by a group of nationalist leaders. It was assumed that national elections would be held at an early date; but the calling of elections was repeatedly postponed by parliament, probably because the members of that body disliked to submit their political future to the uncertain decision of the electorate. It was not until the closing months of 1955 that parliamentary elections were held.

In their long struggle for national independence the nationalist leaders had used slogans drawn from Western political thought; liberty, democracy, parliaments, elections. It is not surprising, therefore, that the long delay in calling national elections began to undermine the moral authority of parliament. An army-instigated demonstration against parliament on October 17, 1952, attacked that body on this point. The political situation was unstable, cabinets were unable to govern effectively and were short-lived. It was hoped that national elections would bring political stability.

The parliamentary elections were conducted in a manner which would have been creditable for a seasoned democracy, but they did not clarify the political situation. The elections gave clear indication of how basically divided the country is. No party emerged with a majority of popular votes nor with a majority of the membership of parliament. Twenty-eight parties and individuals won seats—12 winning only one, but four parties received 78 per cent of the total vote cast. These were the Nationalist, the Masjumi, the Muslim Teachers and the Communist party. The great surprise of the election was the large percentage of the vote captured by the Communist party (16.4 per cent, which was considerably increased in subsequent local elections).

For a better understanding of the political situation a few basic facts about the geographical, demographic and social structure of Indonesia must be kept in mind. Indonesia is an insular country, with four large islands and innumerable small ones. Java,

the smallest of the large islands, with an area of less than one-eleventh of the total area of the country (exclusive of West New Guinea) has two-thirds of the population. In the outer islands are found the important export industries—oil, tin, rubber, bauxite, coconut products. Economic conditions in these islands are more favorable than on crowded Java. Nearly all of Indonesia's four million Christians are found outside of Java.

Because of the large concentration of the country's population on Java, it is the center of political power, whereas the outer islands have the economic strength. The strength of the Nationalist party (secular, with a strong Left wing), of the Muslim Teachers' party (religiously orthodox but politically often supporting radical programs) and of the Communist party is largely centered on Java while the membership of the Masjumi party (moderate, Islamic reformist and pro-Western) is fairly well distributed over the country but with a greater concentration in the outer islands.

The elections of 1955 brought no improvement in the political process; it seems rather to have accelerated the deterioration. Vice President Hatta, a moderate and an able economist, broke with Sukarno and resigned his position in December, 1955. In February, 1957, martial law was proclaimed, giving the president and the army exceptional powers. A year later two former prime ministers, a former minister of finance and the president of the Bank of Indonesia openly joined a rebellion which had been developing in Sumatra and Sulawesi against the Djakarta government. The revolutionary group charged the Sukarno government with corruption, incompetence and pro-Communist policies.

In July, 1959, President Sukarno decreed the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, which since 1956 had been at work drafting a permanent constitution; instead he ordered restoration of the revolutionary Constitution of 1945. This document, which is brief and sketchy, concentrates tremendous power in the president and the armed forces under him. In March, 1960, Sukarno suspended parliament. He then "retooled" the government by creating a number of bodies whose membership is

handpicked by him. A Peoples Consultative Assembly is to meet once in five years to elect the president and determine national policy. In the new organs there are to be no debates and no votes taken. Members must discuss until they reach unanimous agreement. If they achieve this miracle they can still only advise.

Newspapers and political parties are rigorously controlled. The Masjumi and Socialist parties and the Anti-Communist Democratic League have been banned and also a number of other organizations, such as Rotary, Divine Life Society and Moral Re-armament. A National Front, which looks much like the personal party of the President, has been launched with much fanfare. In this "retooling" President Sukarno has had no more loyal supporters than the Communists. The new structure of government, with its wheels within wheels, seems designed to obscure the fact that constitutionally Sukarno is now the absolute ruler of Indonesia. In the past he has exercised political power without taking responsibility for it; quite naturally he is reluctant to lose this advantageous position.

The President-Premier's chief answer to "the message of the peoples' suffering" is whipping up the revolutionary spirit. As the economic and political crisis deepened, his revolutionary frenzy mounted. He called for "a thorough-going overhaul of our state and social system." He has called upon his fellow Indonesians to keep "fanning the flames of the leaping fire. Let us become logs to feed the flames of revolution." If slogans could solve problems, Indonesia would be the happiest of countries, for Sukarno has no match as a slogan-maker.

Neutralism

Indonesia follows a foreign policy of neutrality, or as Sukarno prefers to call it an "active, independent policy," but it is heavily weighted in favor of the Communist bloc. In view of his attitude toward the "capitalistic system" and "free-fight" liberalism, not much else could be expected. According to him, A-bombs and H-bombs, and almost all evils, are the products of capitalism. He declares that the fall of capitalism is a "historical certainty." "Those who cannot

understand or oppose the trend of the times will be destroyed."

What are the political prospects in Indonesia? The Sukarno regime has survived enormous economic difficulties and a large-scale rebellion. By whom would the Sukarno regime be overthrown? Sukarno still has a hypnotic power over the masses. The surrender of the leaders of the rebellion has raised his prestige, but also that of General Abdul Haris Nasution. The latter is regarded by many as the potential saviour of his country, but his position is ambiguous. As the Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff in a civil war situation he has served as a main prop of the government, but he also has the reputation of serving as a check on both Sukarno and the Communists and is regarded by some as a rival of the President.

The Army has closed Communist papers and sharply restricted Communist activities, sometimes to the apparent embarrassment of President Sukarno. The Army has been highly political and may have been infiltrated by Communists. However, the military campaign against the rebels may have brought discipline and developed professional spirit among the members of the armed forces. There is nothing to indicate that General Nasution is not loyal to Sukarno. Moreover, Indonesia has been receiving large supplies of arms from Russia, a development which may not be without its subtle influence. Unless the Communists should attempt to overthrow the government there is little likelihood that the Army would take over. Nor is it probable that Sukarno would turn the reins of government over to the army, except in a very desperate situation.

Can the Communists take over? They are strong in the large cities, which are nearly all on Java, and they are well organized, but the party leaders have been among the chief supporters of Sukarno in his "retooling" of the government. They have applauded the abolition of democratic institutions and their replacement by "guided democracy" and have been very guarded in their criticism of the regime. Even if they could take over Java, they could not win the outer islands, and without them their regime on Java would be starved out in time.

Is there a possibility that the Sukarno regime may collapse? Economic conditions in Indonesia at the moment are very bad. There is much suffering. The "message of the peoples' suffering" has reached President Sukarno in his palace. But Indonesians, especially the peasants on Java, are inured to suffering. They have come through the Japanese occupation and the revolutionary years. Moreover, enervated people do not revolt; revolutions are staged in cities, but the urban populations are not yet so large that the government cannot keep them quiet by jobs and doles.

The Indonesian government can count on liberal amounts of foreign economic aid to save it from collapse. It has and can work both sides of the street, because of the cold war. In the period from mid-1955 to the end of 1960 the United States gave or promised Indonesia economic assistance to the amount of \$272 million and the Soviet Union provided nearly twice that. Japanese reparations have also been a source of aid for a number of years. (An adverse trade balance with Japan of 1.3 million rupiahs has already been cancelled as payment on reparations).

Will Indonesia fall apart? Since the recent rebellion failed, among other reasons, because the movement did not receive whole-hearted support in the outer islands, it may seem absurd to raise the question. The rebellion has been suppressed, but none of the conditions which caused it have been solved. Indonesia conceivably can yet fall apart, but this possibility seems unlikely for some time.

Will Sukarno succumb to the temptation to take West New Guinea from the Dutch by force, now that the rebellion has been put down? In January, Indonesia concluded an agreement with Moscow for the purchase of a large quantity of arms. Djakarta in July announced that the first group of long-range bombers from Russia had arrived in Indonesia. President Sukarno and General Nasution have warned the Netherlands that Indonesia will take West Irian by force if peaceful means fail. The Communist world will gladly supply Sukarno with arms for this purpose and he can count on the Afro-Asian as well as the

(Continued on p. 340)

"The Communists' aim is to unite Laos, Cambodia, North and South Vietnam and build a new state," according to this specialist, who believes that "the long-range objective of the Communist offensive is aimed at Singapore" and, eventually, at India. A strong Vietnam will aid the West.

Lights and Shadows on Vietnam

By THOMAS E. ENNIS

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THE SEEDS of conflict are sprouting rapidly in that land once known as French Indochina, a part of which today is named Vietnam. All Asia is concerned as Washington and Moscow and Peking plan action. From Asian capitals, there were five visits to President Kennedy between February and August, 1961, from emissaries representing Nationalist China, Indonesia, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. Soviet Premier Khrushchev, in the same period, met with six delegations from Indonesia, Burma, Laos, North Vietnam, Communist China and North Korea. The American Chief Executive, on August 3, reaffirmed America's ties with Nationalist China in its opposition to United Nations membership for Red China and stated that the "United States is determined that the Republic of Vietnam shall not be lost to the Communists for lack of any support which the United States government can render."

According to *The Observer* of London

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(November 13, 1960), a revolt against the regime of President Ngo Dinh Diem collapsed after loyal forces entered the capital and lifted the siege of the rebels about the Presidential Palace. The President announced that his government would continue to serve the people under a republican system. The coup was directed by paratroopers against the family oligarchy led by President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brothers who, according to the rebels, were guilty of nepotism and autocratic rule and gave key posts to officials from Central Vietnam—their own birth-places—at the expense of the South Vietnamese. The rebels, after the crisis, promised to continue the struggle against the Communist guerrillas menacing the provinces.

The sub-rosa "Free Democratic party," supporters of the revolt, declared a revolutionary committee had been formed to restore liberty and democracy to the country, continue the fight against the Communist underground and remove President Ngo Dinh Diem from office. The rebels lost. They had underestimated the strength of the President and were unable to bring many of the people into their camp.

The President of South Vietnam is a deeply religious Catholic-Confucianist. Few in high office have been troubled with so many obstacles on the road to peace. The 62-year-old bachelor is strange to most Americans, with his fear of women, his adoration of Gandhi, and his love for Christian saints. He hunts ducks and tigers. Persons he likes, he entertains with long monologues. Those he dislikes, he treats with snarls. He speaks often of the "little people" yet has few con-

tacts with them, preferring to enact the role of a mandarin of ancient China. Until recently, he hoped to convert the Communists; yet he has recognized their danger, comparing them to the hunt. "You must be sure to kill when you hunt tigers. A wounded tiger becomes a mankiller to get food."

Ngo Dinh Diem, son of a high ranking official, was born in a straw hut on his father's estate near Hue'. The family for a thousand years has defended its homeland against encroaching Chinese. At the age of 20 Ngo Dinh Diem graduated at the top of his class from the French school for civil servants at Hanoi. It was not long before he was a District Chief, administering 225 villages. He was made a provincial governor in 1929 and at 32 became Minister of Interior. The young official, fired with patriotism, demanded more freedom for his countrymen. The French ignored his pleas and he resigned.

During World War II, the Japanese, French and Communists struggled for supremacy. Ngo Dinh Diem refused to have any relations with the rival factions, setting his hopes on complete independence. The Communists attacked his family in 1945, arrested him, sacked his library and burned alive his brother, Ngo Dinh Khoi. He was released and in 1946 took no part in the Communists' attacks against French rule. In 1947, the dedicated patriot initiated a "third force," non-violent movement, The National Union Front. Discouraged by its reception from the educated natives, he turned for outside aid, going to Belgium where he lived in a monastery and on to New Jersey, where he secluded himself in a Maryknoll College. Here he remained until after the fall of Dienbienphu when he accepted the premiership of Vietnam (June 15, 1954).

Return of Diem

After returning to Saigon, the Premier discovered he had no reliable battalion, no contact with the villagers, and an empty treasury. The infant regime was plagued with the care of hundreds of refugees pouring out of Communist North Vietnam. His first test of political endurance was the plot of General Nguyen Van Hinh, pro-French commander of the army who sought power by urging his troops to stage a non-violent mu-

tiny. The general was exiled. At this time, the United States stepped into the scene and started training the Vietnamese army.

The Washington Daily News carried front-page stories of the American fiasco in Vietnam in which the United States poured \$1 million daily without checking on its use by inexperienced Vietnamese officials. An editorial (July 20, 1959) reads:

Once again a frightful spotlight is turned on the ghastly errors, misguidance and lamentable cover-up in our foreign aid program as applied . . . to one country Viet Nam. You would think—after the angry reaction to publication of the *The Ugly American* nearly a year ago—that by now vigorous efforts would be made to rectify the wrongs in our official representation abroad. But the evidence is that this sorry record is only being perpetuated.

United States Aid

A Senate Foreign Relations sub-committee, headed by Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Mont.), made public a critical 60-page report (February 26, 1960) charging that major "shortcomings" were found in the United States economic aid program in Vietnam. The sub-committee maintained that the program—in contrast to the military aid which was praiseworthy—lacked "a clear-cut plan and specific goals." It found the program was being managed on the same "crash" basis as after the fall of Dienbienphu and, as a result, exports and industry were not expanding.

The sub-committee found that "top heavy control of this program in Washington" had buried it in red tape, destroying the "initiative" of International Cooperation Administration officials in Saigon who were unable to effect improvements. "Deep concern" was voiced over the 35-to-1 (piastres to dollars) exchange rate set by Vietnam for its commercial enactments, into which most of the United States aid funds streamed. At the current exchange rate \$1 purchased 70-100 piastres. It warned that the low evaluation of aid money deprived the United States of control over half of the funds and handed over "windfall profits" to importers and the local government.

The sub-committee discovered that careless contracting methods had delayed and increased the costs of radio and highway projects. It pointed out that the highway

program had quadrupled in cost and a radio network, begun in 1953, was not yet in operation in 1960. The subcommittee also charged that the total compensation of United States employees was "high by any standards" and was in excess of governmental workers in other parts of the world. It pointed out that one-third of the United States officials in Saigon lived in houses costing the government \$400 monthly. It questioned the need for commissaries as well as hardship pay. The subcommittee demanded an end to the practice of United States officials accepting free homes or cars from the Vietnamese government and foreign aid contractors.

The most efficacious antidote against this lamentable situation is the International Voluntary Services (I.V.S.), founded in 1953, with a governing board drawn from 15 church denominations, Catholic and Protestant, to recruit and administer technical assistance personnel in Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Nepal, Laos and South Vietnam. They have worked four years among the Vietnamese farmers and technicians in a manner the Peace Corps aims at extending on a far larger scale to other undeveloped regions. There are 19 I.V.S. men, in their twenties, all graduates of agricultural colleges, on two-year assignments, planting test plots for hundreds of crops on newly established experimental farms under the supervision of the more experienced experts of the United States International Cooperation Administration (I.C.A.) Mission. They have planted many demonstration gardens in far-away villages showing the peasants the advantages of a varied diet. They use first-aid on the cuts and bruises of farm-workers. Some teach English in the evening hours.

A combat-hardened United States colonel, one of many detailed to train the South Vietnamese army, in discussing the work of these young Americans with a senior member of the I.C.A. Mission, commented:

This is a wonderful bunch of hard-working kids. They are doing more to give the Vietnamese an idea of what Americans are and what they can do than either one of us. And the impression they make here will probably last longer.

President Ngo Dinh Diem, despite the pro-

tests of his American advisers, has begun a program of economic resettlement in the high plateau jungle area north of the capital. These agrovinces or collective villages are condemned by many who see in them the stark Chinese system of collectivism for which the peasantry were forced to work without pay with few enjoying the fruits of toil. The agrovinces actually are bastions of strength. They are organized to resist attack. Each is grouped around a marketplace, with surrounding walls and canals. Every family has its separate unit in residential blocks, with schools, libraries, sanitation, water and electricity supplied. The agrovinces are akin to the European feudal villages safe below towering castles.

The resettlement program is important strategically because one of the problems of security and defense lies in the hundreds of miles of jungle impossible to patrol along the Cambodian and Laotian borders. This area now is becoming an adequate intelligence and defense system as more settlers appear. Here, as the jungle is cleared, products and raw materials are developed. Ramie, a fiber from which cloth can be woven, is being grown, making unnecessary the importation of woven fabrics. A fiber, kenaf, also is cultivated, for the making of bags and ropes, eliminating the importation of about \$3 million worth of fibers. Progress has been made in other fields. About 300,000 families have been placed on 2,150,000 acres once in the hands of the local gentry. Government-controlled credit offices gradually are clipping the claws of the age-old avaracious money-lenders.

Westerners accustomed to democratic procedures, however, do not approve the manner in which the administration functions. The South Vietnamese loyal leaders are dubbed "mandarins" by some of the United States Department of State officials. A group of ex-officers in April, 1960, circulated a petition requesting that President Ngo Dinh Diem "liberalize his regime, expand democracy, grant minimum civil rights and reform the administration, the army, and the economy." The signers were arrested and later sent to "political reeducation camps" where thousands are being "converted." The President in May, 1961, announced the appointment of six new cabinet

ministers in a move toward reformation but this brought about no basic changes because no thought was given to the entrance of opposition members into the cabinet.

President Ngo Dinh Diem not only faces the test to destroy Communist armed power but also to win over the masses. The army and police are too prone to consider every peasant an enemy and arrest, molest or kill a staunch supporter of the government. The civil servants and civil guards do not have sufficient contact with the people. One case, cited by the correspondent of *The London Observer* News Service (June 18, 1961) is the bizarre trial of a group accused of rape, murder and cannibalism.

Senator Gale W. McGee (D., Wyo.), after a junket to Vietnam, defended the type of government created by President Ngo Dinh Diem.

It is far from a democratic undertaking. It is not really representative government by our terms. I submit, however, that the element of time and the toll of experience must be allowed sufficient play to permit the growing up of democracy in Vietnam. We should remember our experience in America, . . . when we adopted our Constitution, . . . but one American male in eight had the right to vote. . . . Our democracy was, in truth, meager. It was a hope and a theory, rather than a fact. I may say that we have been working at the business of achieving more and more democracy for almost two centuries during all of which we have called ourselves a democratic government.

I only say this as a reminder to us that these people started from the jungle, as almost serfs in a colonial state. They did not have the heritage of an experience and a background in Western Europe, as our fathers did. They can hardly be expected to achieve a knowledge or a know-how or a capacity for performance which could make democracy work as ours does. Furthermore, democracy is not the kind of thing which we can announce and impose upon any area. Democracy must take root from within and grow from within. . . . For that reason, I am prepared to indulge the transition in Vietnam from a completely backward political experience — almost no political experience — toward a more responsible kind of political participation which we trust the future may hold for them. (*Cong. Record*, Feb. 9, 1960, 2138-39)

By way of persistent and brutal use of guerrillas the Communists have gained their

greatest victories in Asia. The regimes of Mao Tse-tung in China and Ho Chi-minh in North Vietnam began as guerrilla movements. Laos is within their reach. Guerrilla bands roam in South Korea, in the Philippines, in Burma, in Cambodia, in Thailand. In Malaya, a battle-scarred British Commonwealth Army of 167,000 took eight years to subdue a guerrilla insurrection of some 12,000 marauders. Mao Tse-tung wrote: "Guerrillas are like fish, and the people are the water in which the fish swim. If the temperature of the water is right, the fish multiply and flourish." The temperature was right in Indochina and for eight agonizing years the French tried to destroy guerrilla units of the Vietminh.

Paris sunk \$7 billion in the Indochina War, costing 100,000 dead French and Vietnamese soldiers. In one stage, France committed half a million men to the sad struggle. In South Vietnam, an army of 150,000, trained and equipped by the United States, is faced with extinction from guerrillas numbering about 10,000. Lenin said: "We will first take Eastern Europe, then the masses of Asia. We will surround the United States which will be the last bastion of capitalism. We will not have to attack. It will fall like overripe fruit into our hands." And the words of Lenin today are more pregnant with meaning than ever before in the history of Communist aggression.

The Communists Stalk to Victory

Communist conquests have been possible because the terrain of southeast Asia gives guerrillas an advantage over regular forces. The regulars must guard every bridge, railroad, power station, reservoir, factory and governmental installation. The regulars must protect villages and city folk against acts of terror. The regulars must be on the alert against ambushes and snipers hiding in shrubs and trees along urban roads and rural paths. The regulars are spread out over an entire country, at the mercy of every guerrilla creeping in for the kill. It is estimated that in 1961, 1,000 people were killed monthly by guerrillas, excluding the military, and it was unsafe to travel any road 25 miles beyond Saigon, day or night, without adequate armed protection.

By midsummer the Viet Cong, the guerrillas, controlled the rice-growing provinces south of Saigon, seeing to it that the rice flow into the capital was kept at a trickle, forcing the people to purchase the Asian staff of life at about three times the price of 1960. The Viet Cong began a drive in July to capture the 1.5 million hill people of Central South Vietnam and weld them into an autonomous state. The propaganda among these tribes has been effective. Many refer to the government of South Vietnam as "mydiem"—a contraction meaning "American-Diem clique." The United States Military Advisory Assistance Group instructs the soldiers and civil guardsmen in guerrilla tactics but the jungle terrain favors guerrillas. Rice, fruit and fish are plentiful and money is taken from farmers. When hard pressed the rebels seek sanctuary in Laos and Cambodia where the Vietnamese troops are denied the right of pursuit.

The Communists' aim is to unite Laos, Cambodia, North and South Vietnam and build a new state. Ho Chi-minh declared in 1961 that "victory will be ours." He emphasized the goal of unity, independence and democracy, reiterated anti-American and anti-colonial sentiments and appealed for united opposition. The words of the North Vietnamese leader indicate the determination of the Vietminh to control all Indochina. He implied that control will be achieved by political action but also planned to regroup the army, holding it on the alert. The Joint-Sino-Soviet-DRV¹ Supply and Service Command in Nanning, China, has moved large quantities of prohibited war materiel, such as heavy artillery and Soviet rocket launchers, into North Vietnam. Artillery, including 105 mm. cannon, bazookas, mortars, tanks and military planes, have crossed the Sino-Vietnamese border. The Vietminh Regular Army has been expanded. Three new artillery and six infantry divisions have been formed.

The Vietminh have given clear evidence that their operations are a part of the strategy of world communism. After the death of Stalin the Vietminh leaders announced their loyalty to international communism. In an article in *The People's Army* (March, 1953). General Vo Nguyen Giap, Defense

Minister of the Vietminh, quoted the oath of President Ho Chin-minh "always to be strictly bound to the Soviet Union and to follow exactly the doctrines of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin."

The program for Southeast Asia was laid out in Peking in 1949, when the World Federation of Trade Unions convened. The W.F.T.U. organizes meetings and training courses for discussion of the most effective way to apply the directives laid down by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. to local situations. The key-stone of the program is to intensify guerrilla warfare and terrorist activities, set up subversive "united front" arrangements, instigate labor strife and concentrate upon pro-Communist and anti-democratic propaganda.

Although the spotlight has been thrown upon guerrilla operations, the main danger lies in the politico-social cadres who build the underground movements. In Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam, these cadres are under the control of the Lao Dong Labor party (Communist) and the guerrillas are directed by the Defense Ministry. Probably more than 4,000 of these political agents have bored into South Vietnam and spread over the countryside.

The United States Girds for Action

The Communists, declared President Kennedy before Congress on May 25, "send arms, agitators, aid, technicians, and propaganda to every troubled area. But when fighting is required it is usually done by others." In his concern over the American ability to wage and combat guerrilla warfare, the President has perused the writings of an outstanding expert in this field, Mao Tse-tung. The Chinese leader published in 1937 a primer on guerrilla war which has become a standard text in all the struggles from Indochina to Algeria and Cuba. Mao Tse-tung said: "Do we want the support of the masses? If we do we must go among the masses; arouse them to activity; concern ourselves with their weal and woe." Weapons are important in war but "not the decisive one; it is man and not material that counts." Many ask how is one able to face the great war strength of an enemy? There is the *Tale of the Monkey and the*

¹ Democratic Republic of North Vietnam.

Princess of the Iron Fan. "Though the Princess was a very formidable monster, the monkey, by changing himself into a tiny insect, found his way into her entrails and quelled her."

The Department of State, on August 10, 1961, through its Director of Intelligence and Research, made public the technique to be used for combatting the guerrilla type of "internal wars." "What Khrushchev calls 'wars of liberation' or 'just wars' are now considered the most promising paths to future expansion." The United States plans to combine social reform with guerrilla tactics, based upon movements used in 1776 and Japanese operations in Burma. This new policy is to be based upon (1) the decentralization of combat units into 50-man patrols with natives attached to each unit; (2) where guerrillas are the most active, the area is to be entered by these units; (3) after contact with guerrilla forces, each unit is to notify central headquarters and all adjacent units; (4) headquarters are to send in paratroopers and other mobile units by helicopter to surround all enemy elements; (5) after the region is cleared of guerrillas, there is to be a movement of forces into the adjacent sections to be cleared. The report emphasized the fact that all actions against guerrillas must have the support of the local population, a major problem being the fact that there are "conservative elements who struggle irrationally against reform." It will be necessary to encourage reformers "to organize mass parties, and in certain tense circumstances we may need to help create citizens' militia forces."

Strategic Implications

The Communist drive into Southeast Asia

poses grave challenges. Once the Communists establish bases on the southern shores of the peninsula, Chinese and Russian submarines and surface vessels will be able to menace the sea lanes of the South China Sea to India, Africa and the Middle East. The Communist thrust is motivated by the fact that Southeast Asia is the "rice basket" needed by Peking to supply food when hunger comes to China's millions. Control of this food reservoir would give the Communists strong economic influence over those lands depending upon the rice produced in the southeastern peninsula.

The long-range objective of the Communist offensive is aimed at Singapore, base for control of the Straits of Malacca, and eventual conquest of India and Pakistan. Every successful Communist military operation in Southeast Asia undermines India's eastern borders and, coordinated with Peking's encroachments from Tibet against the northern states of Bhutan, Nepal and Sikkim, encircles India with hostile forces.

India, the most sought prize in southern Asia, will be attained by way of maneuvers in Southeast Asia. The British Empire yesterday was the protector of India against Russian advances. British sea power for two centuries held Russian land power in the struggle for mastery over this part of the world. Today the deserts and mountains of the Indian frontier which blocked the march of Russia are barriers no longer. A vacuum exists to be filled either by the military from Moscow or Peking or by troops directed by Washington. The Kennedy administration, at last, is determined to take a stand in South Vietnam. This stand will raise the United States of America to new and greater heights of leadership.

(Continued from p. 334)

Communist countries to block United Nations intervention in case he does.

Would a war for West Irian precipitate the crisis which might bring the regime down? Not unless it developed into a

protracted war. An Indonesian victory would greatly strengthen Sukarno's position, at least for a while. In any case, the result would probably be closer relations with the Communist countries and greater prestige for the Communist party within the country.

"To expect that the Korean people, without any training and experience in democratic processes of government, can and ought to make democracy work in times like these is expecting something that even the British and the American peoples cannot accomplish." The new leaders of Korea, notes this author, "are determined to carry out their program without all the red tape devised in the name of democracy by inexperienced politicians."

Should We Impose Democracy on Korea?

By NO-YONG PARK

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SINCE the junta seized power on May 16 this year, many people in the United States have been wondering what has gone wrong with our effort to make South Korea a democratic republic.

It is a fact that South Korea is not the only country in Asia where democracy has suffered a setback. But the American people are most keenly interested in what happened in Korea because of the tremendous sacrifices they made in that country. It is there that the United States suffered some 150,000 casualties and sacrificed over \$20 billion in the Korean War. It is there too that she has sunk more than \$5 billion in economic and military aid since the second world war to help create a democratic republic.

The sudden rise of the junta to power has made many Americans wonder if they made all these sacrifices in vain, or if de-

mocracy can be successfully transplanted on Asiatic soil in this age of conflict, and above all, if it will pay to make additional sacrifices to help create democratic institutions abroad. Perhaps a brief examination of the recent events leading to the rise of the junta might give us some of the answers to these questions and help shape our future course to meet the Communist sweep to power.

The Birth of R.O.K.

Lying at the eastern end of the Asian continent, Korea is neither rich nor large. It is a mountainous peninsula of 85,000 square miles with some 35 million people. But its strategic value is immeasurable. If the Communists control it, Korea could serve as a dagger, pointing at the heart of Japan. If the free nations control it, Korea could serve as a beachhead of freedom on the huge continent of Asia. Therefore, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union nor Communist China would relinquish its grip in favor of the other. The natural result of this power struggle was the partition of Korea, committing it to virtual national harakiri.

Originally, the partition was meant to be temporary, created for the purpose of accepting the surrender of the Japanese troops following the second world war. After the acceptance of their surrender, Korea was to be made a unified republic. But all attempts at carrying out this objective failed primarily because of the Soviet

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Union's refusal to cooperate with the United States.

While this country was patiently seeking for their cooperation, the Russians converted North Korea into their satellite. With the wave of the hammer and the sickle, they set up a Communist government prefabricated in Moscow. They created a powerful army out of the Korean exiles who had been living in Manchuria and Siberia since the Japanese occupation of their country. They liquidated the landlords and collectivized their lands. They confiscated all industries and nationalized them overnight. They worked so fast that, by 1948, they were able to withdraw all their troops from North Korea and asked the United States to withdraw her forces from South Korea.

But in South Korea everything bogged down in confusion and inaction. Impatient Korean leaders from Syngman Rhee down were over-anxious to set up a republic, but the American authorities would not allow them to do so lest this action spoil the chances of securing Russian cooperation for the creation of a unified republic.

However, when all efforts to obtain Soviet cooperation failed, the United States reluctantly tossed the Korean question into the lap of the United Nations in the fall of 1947. Subsequently, the United Nations created a commission to supervise a nationwide election in Korea for the purpose of establishing a republic. But the Communists flatly refused to allow the commission to visit North Korea. So it supervised an election held only in South Korea in 1948. The Liberal party won the election and formed the first government of the Republic of Korea, with Syngman Rhee as its president.

The Rise and Fall of Syngman Rhee

The task of making the infant republic work was tough. The complete division of the country made it as difficult as restoring a man's health after he had lost half of his body. But with the generous help of the United States, the Republic of Korea started her life as an independent nation with much hope and expectation. Elaborate plans for reconstruction and development were laid. It seemed for some time as if South Korea would rise as a free, prosperous little republic

which would eventually unite the whole peninsula. Then came the Korean War, which shattered all the elaborate plans for reconstruction and reform.

The war which began on June 25, 1950, and ended on July 27, 1953, left Korea like a garden crisscrossed by giant bulldozers. Millions of people suffered untold hardship and billions of dollars worth of property were destroyed. Worst of all, the country still remained hopelessly divided.

Rebuilding Korea following the war was much more difficult than before because the war destroyed the country so thoroughly, it would have been much easier to build a new nation rather than to salvage, remodel and reconstruct the hopelessly ruined country. But considering the magnitude of the problem, the government under Rhee did well. Thanks to American aid and the devotion and loyalty of the hard-working people, tremendous progress was made toward recovery and reconstruction. By 1958, five years after the conclusion of the truce, Korea's industrial production went up 85 per cent despite the lack of electric power from North Korea. By 1959, the gross national product stood at almost \$2 billion, enough to cover all her consumer requirements. This is very significant because in 1957 Korea had to eat her way through nearly 25 per cent of the total American economic aid given for reconstruction and development.

The inflation of Korean currency was substantially checked, and bank deposits soared as a result. So did tax revenues—they were nine times what they had been in 1953.

Even corrupt practices among the military officials were being rooted out successfully. The man who was charged with this house-cleaning job was Lieutenant General "Tiger" Yo Chan Song, an incorruptible, tough-minded professional soldier who commanded Korea's crack "Capital Division" during the Korean War and won his nickname "Tiger" from admiring General James Van Fleet. For nine months, from February to November, 1959, he investigated the army from top to bottom, and fired six major generals, nine brigadiers and 1,683 other officers of field and company grade, including 61 colonels. His purge prompted at

least one assemblyman to lament that 153 officers committed suicide rather than face court martial.

Given another five years of uninterrupted progress, Korea could have risen above the ruin and destruction brought about by that terrible war, as have Japan and West Germany. But the corrupt practices in the presidential campaign for Rhee's fourth term, especially for the election of Rhee's running mate Lee, touched off a violent student demonstration, resulting in the collapse of Rhee's government.

The original constitution of the Republic of Korea adopted in 1948 provided that the president was to be elected by the National Assembly for a term of four years. He could be re-elected once, but there was to be no third term, let alone a fourth term.

As the second presidential election neared in 1952, there was no certainty that Rhee could be re-elected by the Assembly. So he brought strong pressure to bear on the Assembly and had it amend the constitution so he could be elected by direct popular vote rather than by the Assembly. As a result, he was reelected.

Two years after his re-election, Rhee introduced a new amendment, which would exempt him from the constitutional limitation of two consecutive four-year terms so he could run for the third term. The passage of this amendment, along with 26 other measures, required 136 votes of the Assembly in its favor. But only 135 votes were cast for its adoption. So the presiding chairman, who was a member of Rhee's party, frankly admitted defeat. But on the following day, the government declared that, according to its own interpretation, the measure had passed.

In the face of these maneuvers to perpetuate the already unpopular Rhee government, the opposition leaders formed in 1955 the Democratic party. The following year, this party nominated its leader, P. S. Shinicky, for president and John M. Chang, a graduate of Manhattan College and a devout Roman Catholic, for vice-president. The Liberal party renominated Rhee for president and his henchman, Ki Poong Lee, for vice-president. Just a few days before the election, Shinicky died. So Rhee won his third term without opposition, but his run-

ning mate, Lee, was defeated by John M. Chang.

As the next presidential election was approaching, it became very clear that the aged president would not be able to win his fourth term after all. So he introduced new measures to insure his fourth term victory. One of these measures provided for appointment of all mayors and other local officials by the central government—previously they had been elected by the people. The members of the opposition branded this as Rhee's plot to insure his victory by firing all local officials who did not belong to his party. Believe it or not, Rhee did what his opponents suspected.

Still more objectionable to the opposition party was the measure which provided that anyone who spreads "false facts" or "distorted facts" to benefit the enemy could be jailed for as long as five years. The opposition branded this a "police state law" to suppress all criticism of Rhee's government to clinch his victory in the forthcoming campaign. Rhee contended that the law was necessary to cope with Communist infiltration and subversion, and refused to withdraw it. So all the Democratic party members, 79 strong, barricaded themselves inside the Assembly chamber and refused to let the Liberal party members in. The "sit-down strike" of the opposition party lasted six days.

On the seventh day, 300 policemen broke the barricades. For 20 minutes a free-for-all fight ensued. The police won. Out went 79 bruised Democrats, and in came 128 Liberals. After the eviction of the Democrats, the Liberals adopted Rhee's measures and let the Democrats in. After re-entering the Assembly, the Democrats demanded the nullification of all the bills passed during their absence. This demand caused the Liberals to boycott the Assembly. After prolonged haggling, the members of both parties came together at the Assembly, but the laws continued to remain unchanged.

In the presidential race of 1960, Rhee, then 85 years old, headed the Liberal party ticket for the fourth time, with Ki Poong Lee as his running mate. The Democratic party nominated Pyung Ok Chough for president and John M. Chang, for vice-

president. Just before the election, Chough died while receiving medical treatment in the United States. To prevent the Democrats from nominating a new candidate, the Liberal party set the election date for March 15, two months ahead of schedule. So Rhee again had no one to oppose him, but his running mate Lee had to campaign against John M. Chang who had defeated him in the previous election.

To insure Lee's election as vice-president, the Liberal party employed every dirty, crooked, dishonest and high-handed means known to corrupt politicians. As a result, Lee won by a vote of eight to one over Chang, who had defeated him in the previous election!

The April Revolution

When the election returns were being announced, anti-government demonstrations broke out in Masan, near Pusan. Spearheaded by the students, the people of Masan staged a large demonstration. The police opened fire on the crowd, causing many casualties. The news of the cruel police action incensed the whole country. But it was not until April 11, nearly a month after the election, that the entire country began to sizzle with indignation.

On that day a fisherman cast his line from a pier in Masan where the first demonstration broke out. He felt something nibbling at his line. When he pulled it up came the mutilated body of a 17-year old boy, missing since the election day demonstration. This aroused the entire city against the Rhee government. Led by the students again, the angry citizens of Masan attacked the city hall, the fire station, the police station and other public buildings. The police had to use fire hose, tear gas and rifles to quell the riot. As a result, scores of demonstrators were wounded and killed.

When the news of Masan riot spread, similar demonstrations took place in other cities, including Seoul, the capital. There the students of Seoul National University began anti-government demonstrations on April 19. They were quickly dispersed and many participants were arrested by the police, who had been anticipating this kind of action for a long time. But the students regrouped and renewed their demonstra-

tions. By this time, the crowd swelled to nearly 100,000. Encouraged and emboldened by popular support, the students marched toward the presidential mansion. They were halted by the heavily armed police but demanded that the president receive their delegation to discuss new elections and the police activities on the college campuses. When their request was refused, the students resumed their march. The police threw a tear gas shell which failed to explode. A student moved forward to toss it back, and was shot by the police. At that point, the whole mass turned into an uncontrollable mob and charged forward, braving the hail of bullets. They set fire to the pro-Rhee newspaper building, the headquarters of the so-called Anti-Communist Youth League whose members often acted as the Liberal party's strong-arm boys.

As the situation got out of hand, President Rhee placed Seoul under martial law and called in Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Yo Chan Song. General Song took over the city with his steel-helmeted troops and rapidly restored order without firing a shot. He did so by closing all schools, by suspending all bus lines, and by enforcing a 7 P.M. to 5 A.M. curfew. It seemed as if the country was ready to settle down, but trouble flared up again nearly a week later.

On April 25 some 400 professors from various colleges, followed by several thousand students, renewed the demonstration. They demanded the resignation of Rhee and members of the National Assembly, and the release of all students arrested during the demonstration. This was followed by a new series of anti-government demonstrations. When the situation grew worse, Rhee stepped down on April 25. Subsequently, he slipped out of Seoul and became a political refugee in Hawaii where he had spent many years as an exile when Korea was under Japanese control. So Syngman Rhee, who could have gone down in history as a great patriot, a sort of George Washington of Korea, unfortunately completed his life cycle from exile to exile.

It is inconceivable that a man like Syngman Rhee, who suffered 33 years of exile because of his fight for his country's freedom, should waste the golden opportunity to serve

his country and people by abusing and corrupting his party and government. But that is the temporary verdict of history at this moment.

Minutes after Rhee's departure from the presidential mansion, his running mate, Ki Poong Lee, committed suicide with his entire family.

The New Republic of Korea

Following the resignation of Rhee and the passing of Lee, an interim government was hastily created with Chung Huh as its acting president. This new government swiftly rounded up and placed behind bars many of the corrupt officials and high-handed policemen. The National Assembly discarded the old presidential system of government under which Rhee ruled autocratically for 12 years, and adopted a parliamentary form of government under which the president was to be a mere figurehead and the prime minister was to exercise the executive powers of the state. Then the Assembly set a date for a new election and dissolved itself.

As expected, the election held in July, 1960, brought the Democratic party to power. John M. Chang became the prime minister and Posun Yun became president. As governments go in South Korea, the government of Chang was the closest thing to democracy the Korean people had known. Unfortunately, it did not work. Primarily, it did not fit into the prevailing conditions of the country or the tempo of the people. What the strife-torn country needed at this time was a strong, dynamic, and almost autocratic leadership which could command the solid unity of all parties and the undivided support of the whole country. But the new government had none of these qualities to meet the crisis.

Although honest and patriotic, Chang had neither the political wisdom nor the dynamic leadership to lead the untrained and quarrelsome politicians. In fact, few men could have done much better under the prevailing circumstances. He could not command even the undivided support of his own party. And in the nine months he was prime minister, he had to shuffle his cabinet three times.

Furthermore, the job which Chang took

was too big for any man. The national treasury was empty. The rate of economic growth fell from 8.6 per cent in 1957 to 2.3 per cent in 1960. Unemployment was growing worse with one of four already out of jobs. Above all, the brave but simple folk, who had expected miracles under the new regime, grew impatient, critical and often hostile to the new government.

In the face of the deteriorating situation, Chang's government introduced several worthy measures. To aid the unemployed and speed up reconstruction, it introduced the National Construction Service Program, which was based on the concept of the old W.P.A. and C.C.C. camps in the United States. To implement the program, it appropriated a handsome sum of seven billion hwan (about \$30 million) and set aside \$10 million in agricultural surplus from the United States.

For the purpose of mobilizing moral and spiritual forces to back up the program, the government supported the sort of new life movement that we saw in Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist China, except that it was called the Fresh Tide Society. First begun by the young opposition members of the Assembly, the movement was joined later by the members of both parties. The participants dedicated themselves to austerity and reform. They discarded formal suits and overcoats and wore cheap corduroy suits. They abandoned official cars and tramped to work on foot. They shunned geisha houses and expensive restaurants, imported coffee and cigarettes. Even the prime minister ate his lunch at his desk and ordered other officials not to receive visitors in the morning so they could do their work without interruption. He likewise directed his cabinet members to fire all officials who maintained concubines.

Students in 30 colleges and universities adopted an austerity campaign and volunteered to take part in soil conservation, reforestation and other public works during the vacation. But the movement barely got started when another student demonstration shook the country from one end to the other.

As the anniversary of the April Revolution which toppled Rhee's government was approaching, the prime minister worried over the prospect for a similar uprising. So

he introduced into the Assembly two preventive measures: one to control street demonstrations and the other to crack down on the Communists who had increased their activities considerably. The latter measure provided a two-year jail sentence for anyone who knowingly "praises, aids or admires" members of anti-government groups and a death penalty for anyone acting on the orders of the Communist party.

The left wing organizers struck before the arrival of the anniversary. They staged a four-hour anti-government rally in the city hall plaza after which a mob of some 5,000 Koreans led by 300 students marched against Chang's residence. They carried torchlights and chanted "Overthrow the Chang regime." The police moved in and tried to seize the torches, and a 30-minute battle followed. Students threw sticks and stones and the police used clubs and tear gas. Before order was restored, a number of policemen and demonstrators suffered injury and 123 rioters were arrested. As expected, this incident in Seoul sparked similar demonstrations all over South Korea. When the situation grew worse, President Yun called an emergency meeting in which all factions agreed to observe a truce. So it seemed for a time that Chang's regime might succeed in riding out of the storm. Then came the military coup d'état.

The Rise of the Junta

At 3:30 A.M., May 16, 1961, some 3,000 Korean soldiers and marines led by the army chief of staff, General Chang Do Young, swarmed into the capital and seized the government buildings. At 6 A.M. a six-man junta headed by General Chang announced that the government was under their control. They declared that their aim was to save the nation from corruption and communism.

Minutes later, Marshall Green, then the American chargé d'affaires, and General Carlton B. Magruder, the United Nations commander-in-chief in Korea, expressed their strong disapproval of the action taken by the junta. But the junta paid no attention to the Americans, although their future and that of their country depended on American support. They took the attitude that they would go ahead with their revolution without American aid, if they had to.

The American government and people, who are always allergic to any form of dictatorship, could have taken drastic steps against the military coup. They could have cut off the aid which is the life-blood of Korea. They could have empowered General Magruder to use his authority as commanding general of all United Nations forces, including those of Korea, to crack down on the junta leaders who had staged the revolt with the troops withdrawn from the operational command of General Magruder without his knowledge or approval.

No one can tell what would have happened had the United States taken such a course. But no action was taken other than the mere statement of displeasure made by United States representatives in Seoul who acted on their own initiative without consultation with, or instructions from, Washington. As a result, Prime Minister Chang resigned with his entire cabinet and went into hiding. President Yun also resigned, but was persuaded to remain as a figurehead of the new government.

Now the six-man junta, subsequently increased to 32, formed an all-military cabinet of 14 headed by General Chang. By the wave of the wand, this junta government suspended the constitution, dissolved the National Assembly, abolished the civil-judicial system, suppressed freedom of expression, and instituted an ironfisted dictatorship.

Unlike Castro's Cuba or Mao's China, there were no mass executions or murders in Korea. But the junta government arrested and imprisoned hundreds of former government officials, thousands of Communists, leftists and liberals as well as black market operators, jaywalkers, prostitutes and even young people dancing at nightclubs. It also dissolved all political parties and labor unions representing the workers, farmers and fishermen; it dismissed 1,380 village heads-men, soldiers and policemen for keeping concubines; it fired 3,000 government officials for draft dodging and abolished expense accounts for all government officials; and above all, it arrested 10,000 known gangsters and thieves, and put them to work in mines, road building projects and other public works. It likewise imprisoned 12

top millionaire businessmen on charges of making dishonest fortunes, and confiscated rice from merchants accused of hoarding and distributed it free to hungry people; it froze all loans bearing interest rates of more than 20 per cent (some lenders charged up to 80 per cent). It brought in giant bull-dozers, ploughed under Seoul's worst slums, and herded the occupants into temporarily erected tents with the promise that they would be housed in decent homes.

Six weeks after the coup, General Chang, who had been chairman of the junta and premier of the junta government, was forcibly replaced by Major General Pak Chung Hi, who had long been regarded as the real power behind the throne.

General Pak is a career military man trained in Japanese military schools. In 1949, when he was a Korean military officer, he was court-martialed and sentenced to death for collaborating with the Communists. He was released before the Korean War and subsequently became a staunch anti-Communist and the chief of operations of the R. O. K. army. At the time of the May coup, Pak was General Chang's deputy, but he actually masterminded the whole affair. When the revolution was progressing satisfactorily without much opposition at home or abroad, Pak let the cat out of the bag and seized power.

Following his take-over, he made the famous General Tiger Song his prime minister and purged more Communist collaborators. He went so far as to arrest former Premier John M. Chang and seven cabinet ministers, labelling them pro-Communist plotters. Later he released one-third of the 20,000 prisoners, including 2,560 of the 3,098 political prisoners.

What effect have all these drastic reforms had on Korea? On the spot reports made several months after the coup yielded these observations: The smugglers' high-powered launches which once thronged the harbors disappeared from sight. Vanished too were the beggars, loafers, jaywalkers, prostitutes and the little tots who extorted money from passing women by threatening to smear dirty hands on their dresses.

Since the hoodlums were jailed or put to work, the price of police dogs dropped by one-third. Since the draft-dodgers quit

their jobs and enlisted in the armed services, hotel guests had to operate their own elevators. There were no more protest signs on the streets, no more arguing, growling or congregating in cafes, parks or street corners. The people, including students, thought such action unwise and imprudent. They just shrugged their shoulders, lifted their eyebrows, nudged each other, and did not take chances. Observers, however, did not get the impression that the people were sullen and silent, waiting to rise against another oppressor. On the contrary, Koreans seemed willing to wait and see what the new regime can and will do.

The Ailing Economic Situation

What the new government must do above all else is to improve the economic situation of the country which has been deteriorating progressively. When the junta seized power this was, and still is, the economic picture of Korea: Out of a total labor force of about ten million, only half were fully employed. The annual individual income, which was up to \$105 a few years ago, was down to about \$60. A runaway inflation pushed the price index from 100 in 1953 to 400 in 1961. Total exports in 1958 amounted to only \$16.5 million against \$378 million in imports, mainly from the United States. The yearly output of electricity was only 1,500,000 kw.hrs, whereas North Korea, the industrial section of the country, produced 7,600,000 kw.hrs without too much additional effort.

One reason for the economic plight of Korea is its division: North Korea with an area of 47,862 square miles and a population of 7,972,000, and South Korea with an area of 37,424 square miles and a population of 22,746,000, including about 4,000,000 refugees from North Korea. Before the partition, the North provided resources, hydroelectric power and manufactured articles and the South furnished agricultural products. The split destroyed this economic balance, causing hardship to both.

However, North Korea did better by exchanging her industrial products with the agricultural produce of Communist China until the latter was faced with severe shortage of food. She did so well that nearly 68,500 out of some 800,000 Koreans resid-

ing in Japan actually moved to Communist North Korea.

It is a fact that the poor economic situation in South Korea was not the only reason why the Koreans in Japan migrated to North Korea. The Chosen Soren, a pro-Communist Federation of Korean Residents' Association in Japan, brought a tremendous pressure to bear upon the Koreans by promising them homes, jobs, education and free transportation aboard Russian ships. Furthermore, most of those who went to North Korea were the poorest, who had suffered poverty and misery, or the more radical and troublesome elements who were unwelcome either in over-crowded Japan or South Korea. But the fact is that for the first time in modern history, people crossed the Iron Curtain in the wrong direction, constituting a reversal of the flight of people from communism to the free world.

The heavy military expenditure for the maintenance of the world's fourth largest standing army of over 600,000 men is another cause of Korea's pitiful economic situation. Faced with a formidable enemy backed by the overwhelming power of the Communist world just across the thirty-eighth parallel, South Korea has been forced to maintain a huge force to insure her survival, and she is not rich enough to provide her people with both rice and bullets. Although the United States gives over \$200 million in military aid annually, she spends almost half of her entire national revenues for her armed forces. This leaves very little for the development of a sound economy.

The unstable political situation is another cause of Korea's economic troubles. Unlike post-war Japan, Formosa and West Germany, which enjoyed political stability favorable for economic development, Korea has seen no such stability. From the very beginning, the Communists stirred up so much trouble through infiltration and subversion that the South Koreans simply could not create the political stability necessary for economic development.

This is by no means to excuse the graft, corruption and inefficiency of the Korean government. But the Korean people, by and large, are thrifty, hardworking people with a high degree of efficiency, intelligence and patriotism. Given a fair chance, they

could have done as well as any other people, but they could not do well under the adverse conditions which prevailed. I doubt if others could have done better in a similar situation.

The economic picture might have been brighter had the Korean government paid more attention to agricultural reforms rather than trying to create a new industry. In a country where 70 per cent of the population is dependent on agriculture, agrarian reform was and still is the most urgent task. But the problem has not been tackled with any urgency or efficiency. It was not until 1950, five years after the surrender of Japan, that a land reform law was ready for promulgation. The Korean War which broke out in the same year prevented its effective administration. And today, years after the adoption of the agrarian reform law, the farmers are worse off than ever before. They cannot even produce enough food to feed the people of South Korea, whereas before the partition, they produced enough to feed the whole country and export the surplus. Part of the trouble, of course, is due to drought and flood, but no one can put all the blame on weather.

To tackle these pressing economic problems, General Pak introduced a five-year plan. His aim is to raise the gross national product by 46.3 per cent in five years. To mobilize the moral and material resources of the nation for his program, General Pak issued a 74-point manifesto calling for voluntary reforms of a whole chain of objectionable habits, ranging from failure to pay taxes to being late in appointments. The women were advised to shun jewelry and housemaids, and practice and teach birth control. Men were advised to get rid of the idea of making "quick money" and resort to thrift and hard work. Both men and women were urged to greet each other with the words, "Let us reconstruct." As in the Communist countries, the people were required to do daily calisthenics, and sing patriotic songs, stressing anti-communism, independence, brotherhood and reconstruction.

It is difficult to predict whether the junta leaders can cure all the ills of Korea. But they are trying, trying not by democratic methods which we approve, but by totali-

tarian methods which we disapprove. Of course, they may not resort to extreme Communist methods, replete with communes and mass executions. But they are determined to carry out their program without all the red tape devised in the name of democracy by inexperienced politicians. They feel, as many other Asian leaders do, that in this turbulent age of war and crisis, it will be more difficult for them to develop industry and govern their restive people by democratic principles and methods than by authoritarian principles and methods. So they follow the leaders of Burma, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Pakistan, Syria, Thailand and Turkey. General Pak and his associates declared that they will relinquish their power in favor of a constitutionally instituted democratic government by May, 1963, when they expect to finish their work. But no one can tell how long it will take for them to complete their revolution and reconstruction. Nor can anyone tell if they will relinquish their power voluntarily when their work is done.

Should We Impose Democracy on Korea?

When the junta set up a military dictatorship, a great many Americans felt that the United States should have insisted on the restoration of the democratic government. They have contended that our continued support of the junta would compromise our professed aim of supporting democracy against dictatorship, and that as a result, the United States would cease to be a symbol of human liberty. But those who advocated the adoption of such a course did not seem to understand that few people can make democracy work well in time of war and crisis.

Even the American and the British, with all their training and experience, cannot make democracy work in time of war and crisis. Whenever war comes they pack their democracy, store it away in the attic, and put on totalitarian garb and fight the war on a totalitarian footing because war cannot be waged by democratic principles and methods. When peace returns, they take their democracy out of mothballs and enjoy it just as long as peace prevails. To expect that the Korean people, without any training and experience in democratic processes of government, can and ought to make democracy

work in times like these is expecting something that even the British and the American peoples cannot accomplish.

Furthermore, many advocates of exporting democracy fail to see that a democracy which does not work is a greater ally of communism than a dictatorship which does. For when democratic government fails to function, chaos results, and where there is chaos, the Communists take over the country. Therefore those who blindly insist on exporting democracy without considering these facts are actually playing into the hands of the Communists who would like nothing better than freedom and democracy introduced to all countries, except their own. Unfortunately, the idea of exporting democracy to other countries is so universally popular that the mere questioning of the soundness of that idea is considered an act of heresy; blind opposition to all forms of authoritarianism under all circumstances is regarded as the sacred duty of all free peoples. Needless to say, the pursuance of such a course by the freedom-loving people has often helped the cause of communism rather than democracy.

Freedom loving people opposed Batista. So did the Communists. Now we have Castro. They opposed Chiang Kai-shek. So did the Communists. Now we have Mao Tse-tung. If we oppose General Pak, who knows what we will have next in Korea?

Furthermore, those who insist on imposing democracy on other nations don't seem to understand that, in this day and age when the Communists are stirring up war in the four corners of the earth, freedom is the most effective weapon of Communist subversion and democracy is the most deadly instrument of Communist conquest. A brief examination of the closing days of the Chinese civil war will illustrate this point.

In the midst of a devastating war, the Nationalists introduced an elaborate program of democratic reforms, of course with the advice and encouragement of the American government. They adopted a democratic constitution, held a national election, and created a republican form of government; they attempted to govern the war-torn country and continue their fight against the Communists according to democratic principles and methods. As expected, the new reforms

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Has Laos lost control of its destiny? To a certain extent, yes, says this author, noting that "the force of world opinion and fear of a nuclear war all but preclude resort to military solutions of world conflicts, thus channeling potential military struggles into an inherently dangerous poker game involving political chicanery, military outposting and unabashed psychological warfare."

Laos: Pawn in Power Politics?

By GERALD CANNON HICKEY AND ADRIENNE SUDDARD

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LATE IN DECEMBER, 1956, when the Royal Laotian Prince Savang Vatthana stepped from the DC-3 that transported him to the northern highland town of Nam Tha, he was greeted by hundreds of people, most of whom were members of the varied ethnic groups living in this wildly beautiful mountainous area. They had come many days by foot from the crests, slopes, and valleys of the mountain chain Laos shares with China and Vietnam to swear loyalty to the throne.

There were Khmu, one of the Mon Khmer-speaking groups generally designated as "Kha," the indigenous people of the Laotian highlands. There also were many Tai-speaking groups, the most numerous of which were the Black Tai, so called for the dark color of their women's costume. Although the Black Tai, Lu, Tai, Neua and other Tai-speaking groups have long been settled in Laos, they, like their linguistic cousins, the lowland-dwelling Lao, the majority ethnic group of Laos, migrated from southern China centuries ago. Finally, there were Meo—tough, tenacious people who began

migrating into Laos from southern China via the summits during the past century. Their ethnic kin, the Yao, also were represented, and there were scattered groups of Lolo, Ho, and Houei, also migrants from southern China.

The gathering for the "great oath" at Nam Tha, in addition to being colorful and impressive, was symbolic. In 1956, Laos was not only a newly independent state, it also was a newly established nation with the designation and delineated borders we know today. The national entity we call Laos had never existed prior to the Geneva truce agreements of 1954, as a glimpse at Lao history will reveal. From the viewpoint of Lao Society, the array of people that greeted the royal prince at Nam Tha reflected graphically the staggering ethnolinguistic complexity of Laos. Prophetically, the prince as the central figure—the officiant—in the great oath ceremony represented the only institution in Laos around which national sentiment could be rallied—the throne.

To achieve national unity in a country like Laos is a task worthy of the most able Bismarck or Garibaldi. Ethnic heterogeneity all too often in the case of Laos generates seemingly endless permutations of inter-group conflicts. Further, the geography of Laos renders the task of achieving a well-developed system of communication almost insuperable. The rugged terrain offers little in the way of natural routes, and the Mekong River which runs practically the entire length of Laos is segmented by periodic rapids which restrict river travel to particular

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sections. Roads recently have been improved but still are extremely inadequate, as are other means of communication. Finally, there is the persistent regionalism that characterizes the history of the Lao people.

While current writers almost invariably describe Laos as a latter-day lotus land, Lao history could scarcely be considered a gently unfolding tale—rather, it has been singularly dramatic and at times violent. Although it is unrecorded in history, some scholars contend that small movements of Tai-speaking peoples began moving into the Indochinese peninsula as early as the eighth century when the Tai kingdom of Nan Chao was established in what is now southwest China. History does record, however, mass migrations of Thai refugees into Southeast Asia in the thirteenth century when the armies of Kublai Khan invaded Nan Chao, destroying Ta Li, the capital. Following the river valleys southward, Tai-speaking groups eventually settled large areas of present-day northern Burma, Thailand, northern Vietnam and Laos.

In the Mekong River valley, the ancestors of the Lao people established a series of *muong*, characteristic Thai political enclaves similar in organization and function to medieval European principalities. Muong Swa (later known as Luang Prabang) emerged as the most powerful *muong* in the area, and in 1353, Fa Ngoun, the ruler of Muong Swa, expanded his territory, absorbing most of what is today Laos and northern Thailand, declaring it the kingdom of Lan Xang.

The period that followed Lao expansion was characterized by conflicts with the neighboring kingdoms of Annam (early Viet Nam), Champa (a kingdom that flourished in what is now central Vietnam), the Khmer empire (the ancient kingdom of the Cambodians), and Ayutthaya (now Thailand). By the end of the sixteenth century, Lan Xang faded, spent by internal and external strife. The seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were a time of division among the Lao people; in 1707, Kitsarath, grandson of Soulingna Vongsa, the last ruler of Lan Xang in its imperial phase, fled the capital of Vientiane where his cousin Sai Ong Hue ruled, and took refuge in Luang Prabang where he established a separate kingdom. Shortly afterwards, in 1713, an-

other prince of the royal family founded the kingdom of Champassak in the southern Mekong valley.

Weakened by division and quarrels among themselves, the Lao kingdoms maintained independence with difficulty. In the middle of the nineteenth century the Siamese invaded the kingdom of Vientiane, totally destroying the capital. The defeated kingdom became a province of Siam, and the sister kingdoms of Luang Prabang and Champassak fared little better, both becoming vassal states of the Siamese throne.

European Intervention

About this time, European nations entered the power struggle in Southeast Asia. France annexed Cochinchina as a colony in 1864 and declared Tonkin and Annam protectorates in 1884, thus gaining control of that part of Indochina which is now Vietnam. In 1864, France also declared Cambodia a protectorate. Finally, in 1893, a treaty with the Siamese involving territorial concessions permitted the French to create the protectorate of Laos. The borders of the new protectorate were the borders of the present kingdom of Laos, and the city of Vientiane became the administrative capital, the seat of the French *resident supérieur*.

By and large, French rule rested lightly on Laos, and with the exception of several minor rebellions among highland groups, the period until 1940 was relatively calm. The French expanded some social services in Laos, although the marked absence of political education during the colonial period left independent Laos with a paucity of trained leaders and administrators. Another omission was the failure to tap any of the economic potentialities of Laos—indeed, trade with the outside world was inhibited by establishing inaccessible Saigon as the entrepôt of Indochina, thus turning Laos away from its natural channel of seaborne trade, i.e., Bangkok.

The collapse of French power in Southeast Asia in the course of World War II and the wartime occupation by the Japanese of large parts of the area marked a major turning point in the history of the peninsula. Japanese successes acted as a catalyst on Southeast Asian national movements, and with the end of the war, independence be-

came the immediate and overriding goal of the former colonies and protectorates. Although relatively peripheral to the Viet Minh movement centered in Vietnam, Laos, at the Geneva truce agreements of 1954, also received *de facto* independence from France.

It is difficult to say how far Laos might have proceeded, given peace, toward the solution of such fundamental problems as the establishment of national political unity, the creation of conditions for national economic development, and the extension of educational opportunity. Within Lao society itself, the traditional feudal-like social organization has persisted until the present. As a result, the effective leadership in Laos has been in the hands of a dozen or so families who trace their ancestry to the ancient royal line of Luang Prabang. Even during the French rule this small Lao élite, though stripped of actual control, filled most important administrative positions. By contrast the majority of the Lao population is made up of villagers—illiterate, isolated, and in many instances politically apathetic.

Divisive Elements

This political, cultural and economic gap represents a fundamental weakness in the Laos polity. It unfortunately is compounded by another chasmal social situation—between the Lao and the ethnic minorities, most of whom are upland-dwelling people. The Lao all too often approach the minorities with an air of superiority, and there have been recent attempts to "Laoize" highland people by bringing them down to the lowlands to learn the Lao way of life. These attitudes and actions have stirred resentment among the minority groups; as one disgruntled elderly Khmu put it, "All the Lao are bosses." The Pathet Lao have not ignored the opportunity to exploit this situation; ominously, recent reports indicate that better than half the Pathet Lao troops are non-Lao.

There is another divisive element: the unchecked pursuit of personal advantage by the ruling élite. Graft among government officials and the misdirection of foreign aid funds to personal ends, usually cited a little enviously in terms of cars, homes and whiskey, can be related to age-old precedent and the perspective of history is essential. But

we tend to let our attention be diverted from the aggravation of the economic imbalances in Laos by poorly conceived and poorly administered foreign aid, in particular, American aid. Although France, the Colombo Plan nations, several specialized agencies of the United Nations, and the Philippines, Japan, and Thailand have all given economic or technical assistance to Laos, the United States aid program, totaling over \$300 million, is by far the largest—and the most disruptive—of the national economy. The allocation of approximately two-thirds of United States dollars in Laos to army salaries and to commodity imports has, as the Pathet Lao has been quick to point out, appreciably benefited a small circle of government officials, army officers, and importers but ignored fundamental needs of the rest of the population. The balancing of policy objectives can be argued endlessly. The purpose here is to add the adverse effects of foreign aid to the internal problems besetting Laos.

Communist Pressure

But such problems, to a greater or lesser degree, face all new countries today in their transition from dependent to independent status. The central fact in evaluating the present tragic situation in Laos is that from the beginning this strategically located little kingdom has been the target of unrelenting Communist pressure. The Pathet Lao, spawned and directed by the Vietminh, controlled the two northern provinces of Laos, Phongsaly and Samneua, at the end of the Indochina war and were able to parlay this foothold by 1958 into participation in a coalition government. For a brief time in 1958 the Pathet Lao leader, Prince Souphanouvong, and the Pathet Lao theoretician, Phoumi Vongvichit, held cabinet positions and the Pathet Lao won representation in the National Assembly through the electoral victory of the Neo Lao Hak Sat (the legal political party formed by the Pathet Lao).

But the Pathet Lao leaders, failing to achieve real political leverage, resumed the campaign for Laos by subversion, propaganda and guerrilla warfare. This harassment of the royal government proliferated into a three-way war following the coup d'état of politically inexperienced Kong Le,

whose call for "peace and neutrality" was quickly turned to the promotion of Communist purposes. The royal government, sharply divided over policy toward the Communists, split into neutralist (Prince Souvanna Phouma) and pro-West (Phoumi Nosavan) factions. It was at this stage of the battle for Laos that Soviet support of the guerrillas became clear. There was an open airlifting of military equipment to Kong Le, whose role as supporter of Prince Souvanna Phouma was soon absorbed by the Pathet Lao. The United States, countering the Soviet action, stepped up military assistance to the pro-West group of Phoumi Nosavan.

The indecisiveness of military victories in a jungle war, which made progress of the war difficult to follow, contributed to the frustrating position of the anti-Communist forces. Intervention by Seato, which had been formed specifically to maintain peace in Southeast Asia, was suggested but foundered on the perhaps justifiable reluctance of Great Britain (remembering Malaya) and France (remembering Indochina) to commit their troops to another jungle war and on the general fear of any action that might touch off a third world war. The United Nations, whose special inspection team a year earlier had effected a lull in the fighting, was this time immobilized by the Soviet veto.

Attention turned to the negotiation of a cease-fire and the peaceful solution of differences, a course opposed at first by the Phoumi Nosavan forces, who had recaptured Vientiane, the administrative capital, and, following the flight to Cambodia of Prince Souvanna Phouma, installed a new government headed by Prince Boun Oum. To Phoumi Nosavan and his adherents the negotiation of peace with the Pathet Lao was bound to result in concessions to an enemy irrevocably committed to eventual control of Laos.

The Right wing government of Prince Boun Oum, through a combination of persuasion and pressure, was finally brought to the conference table in Geneva, but the dilemma of these leaders mirrored the larger dilemma facing Laos.

Given the military and economic weaknesses of the country, solutions to the problem of securing the future of Laos as an independent nation fall into two categories:

open alignment with a power bloc of one form or another or strict neutrality within a world balance of power. A postulate of either course is the political unity of Laos; and the failure of Laos to achieve unity of purpose among the various groups in the population, if attributable to preoccupation with the more pressing demands of Communist pressure, has in any case to be accepted as fact.

Danger of Foreign Intervention

The reluctance of the Boun Oum government to participate in a 14-nation conference on the future of Laos before domestic conditions had been made stable was reluctance to give a legal foothold in the government of Laos to a naturally unassimilable force. Prince Sihanouk, suddenly hesitant on the eve of the Geneva conference, argued that "the King [of Laos] felt that to ask foreigners to bring about a reconciliation between Laotian political leaders having opposing views and to organize a conference in which Laos would be treated as an offender amounted to seriously interfering in Laotian affairs."

Why, then, did the Boun Oum government send representatives to Geneva? To what pressures were Boun Oum and Nosavan yielding? The answers of course lie outside Laos, in the complexities of the East-West struggle, where Laos is but a pawn. In the strategic reasoning of both the Communist powers and the free world leaders, Laos is the key to control of Southeast Asia, and the importance of Southeast Asia in geopolitical as well as economic terms is recognized by both.

The force of world opinion and fear of a nuclear war all but preclude resort to military solutions of world conflicts, thus channeling potential military struggles into an inherently dangerous poker game involving political chicanery, military outposting and unabashed psychological warfare. Does this mean Laos has lost control of its destiny? To a certain extent this, unfortunately, is true. The play of the precarious balance of power between East and West will determine the reliability of any "guarantees" of independence for Laos by world powers.

A true neutrality in Laos could be sustained only with their concurrence and

might well depend ultimately on the neutrality of the rest of Southeast Asia, on the model, perhaps, of the Scandinavian peninsula. There is a growing tendency to make a distinction between true neutrality and the "neutralism" professed by many of the smaller and newer states, whose neutralist positions can in numerous instances be reduced to political opportunism. The bipolar nature of world politics encourages this somewhat Machiavellian behavior, but as Carlos P. Romulo remarked recently, "We small nations recognize ourselves as the grass that gets trampled when the elephants fight." The major concern of Laos should be to find a sounder basis for economic and political development, to be less dependent on assistance motivated primarily by the exigencies of a world power struggle.

The first steps in this direction may already have been taken—in the activities of the United Nations and the regional development plans of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), in the formation of an Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) for cultural and economic cooperation, in the successful operation in Southeast Asia of such plans as the Colombo Plan, which embrace a larger geographical area. More recently, the Lower Mekong River Development Project proposed in the United Nations and being carried out under its auspices holds addi-

tional promise of regional economic development. Initial implementation of this project has begun with current preliminary field research by a Ford Foundation-sponsored international group of technicians and scientists in the Mekong River area.

There has been less and less enthusiasm among Southeast Asian countries for open alliance with the United States and the former colonial powers. The issue of colonialism is a factor, though this has been blunted considerably by the granting of independence and the postwar economic assistance of the Western powers. There is, too, the appearance of unreliability generated by the failure of Seato to act in the Laos crisis. A third factor, real but less explicit, is the feeling that dependence on the United Nations can be justified whereas dependence on a big power or powers detracts from the new dignity acquired with independence.

The alternative for Laos to the development of the conditions of true neutrality, with the help of those powers genuinely interested in this goal, is daily made clearer. The alternative remains the same in any guise—a coalition government of neutralism, partition of the country, Communist takeover, followed by retreat of the West in an unresolved war to the borders of Thailand and Cambodia.

"Basically there are three ways and only three in which we can have peaceful coexistence. The one is if we agree to settle all our disputes by negotiation. The second is if there is absolute respect for treaties and agreements freely signed. And the third is if we are willing to set up collective machinery to keep the peace if it is broken by deliberate intent.

"Those plain statements ought to suffice and to be enough. But I must take them further, because it is necessary to say that negotiations must not be looked upon as a means of gaining victory by one side over the other. The treaties must be kept not only in the spirit but in the letter and where there is an aggression—when there is an aggression—that collective action must be supported by all the rest against the one who breaks the peace.

"When one side advertises its intention to destroy the way of life of the other, then you cannot have true collective security. You may try and establish collective security by a majority vote and acting upon it. But immediately, of course, that action is condemned and frustrated by every trick in the political pack. And so long as the world is divided, the United Nations will only be a shadow of what it ought to be.

"... I think the doctrine of coexistence is the most sterile and negative conception of international life in the twentieth century."—*British Foreign Secretary Lord Home, in an address before the U.N., Sept. 27, 1961.*

"The Japanese are Asian in culture and location, but not in education, development or independence," writes this specialist. "The mere element of propinquity binding Japan and the Southeast Asian states is not so important as the ex-colonial status which the Southeast Asian states share with the new African nations. In that sense, Japan has outgrown Asia."

The New Japan in a Troubled Asia

By PAUL M. A. LINEBARGER

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Victors, no less than vanquished, are often undone by wars. The Wilsonian victory for democracy has been followed by dictatorships on a world-wide scale. The victorious British, who declared war on Hitler in 1939 for the sake of Poland, now see a Poland irrecoverably remote from British alliance or interest. In East and Southeast Asia, the Japanese won their first phase of a war "against communism," as they so loudly put it between 1931 and 1941, but they face more communism than ever before, while the United States, who "fought against militarism and aggression" between 1941 and 1945, faces a China wherein warlordism, in centralized and disciplined form, has become chronic and endemic. It is a sad and comical paradox that the "good" Japan which exists today, demilitarized and reformed, must cope with problems created by the "bad" Japan of the past.

Japan's relations with Asia are indeed overshadowed by the recent past; it may

be another generation before the effects of the Greater East Asia War, usually regarded in the United States as a mere sector of World War II, fade into the indifference of old history. Meanwhile the Japanese continue to be confronted by old fears and old angers, to which they themselves contributed so much 20 and 30 years ago.

Red China has had to make the "great leap backward" this past year in revising and balancing ill-conceived national and social plans previously committed to a "great leap forward," and the internal pressures within a militarized, totalitarian Red China today are often strikingly reminiscent of the economic and social pressures which pushed Japan from one adventure to another in the 1930's. Nevertheless, it would be a great mistake to draw too raw a parallel between the Japan of 30 years ago and the China of today. Japan was then and is now the more advanced of the two countries, politically, scientifically, intellectually and technologically. Literacy and cultivated brain-power should never be discounted as national assets; even in their mistakes the Japanese have had a more advanced and educated population with which to deal than have the Chinese.

The change is not only within Japan. The Asia around Japan has changed too. Twenty years ago, Pakistan was the dream of a few fanatics, Indian diplomacy a phantom within a problematical future, and the "neutralist bloc" completely unforeseeable. (The idea that an independent India, threatened by Chinese territorial aggression, would beg *not* to be helped by the United States

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or the United Nations would have lain, in 1941, beyond the maddest of possible conjecture. Bismarck once said that with the best intelligence available in the chancellories of Europe, no one could see more than three years ahead. Modern Asia seems to have borne out the wisdom of his comment.) The new states all have problems of their own; relations with Japan, except for the case of Korea, are a minor matter in most of Asia. Other issues cloud the scene. The Japanese, who once dominated the center of the Asian landscape, now stand modestly on the sidelines.

One can even list, as a means of approach, eight major references which frame the conduct of Japan toward the other Asian states, and of these states toward Japan. These can be enumerated in the following order, though it would be a rash observer who would attempt to grade these factors as to weight or relative importance: (1) the presence of new Asian nations with policies and demands of their own against the world community, most of which have little to do with Japan; (2) the displacement of strategic or economic geography as an overriding determinant in the Japanese view of military and trade policy, and its replacement by an almost truly global outlook; (3) partial Japanese commitment to the cold war by the acceptance of American military tutelage under the security treaty, and the continuing problems which arise as that treaty becomes slowly obsolete for both countries concerned; (4) the Japanese drive for a genuine political and diplomatic independence from the United States, a policy which by now is almost overfulfilled; (5) the avoidance of direct rivalry with Red China which might make Japan, instead of the United States, the prime bugaboo of the Communist bloc, both Asian and European; (6) the exertion of international influence in Asia without the trappings of international leadership; (7) the exchange of roles with China, as

against the early twentieth century, in which a pacific and unobtrusive Japan seeks to avoid provocative incidents with a militant and militarist Red China, when the opposite used to be the case; and (8) the development of a strong interest in and commitment to the United Nations.

Taken together, these factors make an enormous difference in Japan's Asian contacts and may explain why, at a time of short tempers and harsh words prevailing in many parts of the world, the Japanese are conspicuous by their absence from quarrels and their ability to stay out of conflicts that do not immediately pertain to their national prosperity or their national security.

Further, ahead of all these factors but coloring each of them, there is a change in the underlying public philosophy of Japan. Japan used to be the country in which traditionalism and imperialism were so smoothly blended that it was impossible to tell where the old chivalric Japan left off and the modern imperialist Japan began. Following the fire and humiliation of defeat and surrender, the Japanese have turned to another facet of their own traditional culture—the cultivation of inwardness, the understanding of a beauty which rests in sparseness and scarcity, the patriotism so deep that it rests on an awareness that there can be no other Japan.¹ This change in the public philosophy implies no convulsion of character, but is merely a choice between past Japans, both of which have left traditions—the expansionist Japan of Hideyoshi or of Tojo, and the closed Japan of the Tokugawas.

The current Japanese ideology sees neither glory nor profit in military power. Power becomes no more than an antiseptic, to seal off the contagion of a wounded frontier. The dreams for which men died less than 20 years ago have obsolesced more than have the ideals of the Confederate States of America. This is so evident to any observer in Japan that one can say, safely, that those countries which understand Japan well do not fear Japan, while those who lack a well disseminated knowledge of Japan (such as the Philippines or Australia) still have a genuine fear of a renewal of Japanese aggression.

Even the postage stamps of the two countries show the change. The illustrations in

¹ A major Japanese post-war novel, recently reissued in English translation (Berkley Medallion Book #BG 498, New York, N. Y., 50¢ paperbound) is Jiro Osaragi, *Homecoming*, which poignantly portrays the shift from one Japan to the other. It is interesting that Osaragi had to make his hero, who is portrayed as anti-war from the start, as a sort of Byronic wanderer and cosmopolitan, educated vagabond. Osaragi is right: it would have been almost impossible to portray any normal Japanese as anti-war, once the war had started, just as it would now be impossible to portray a normal Japanese as pro-war, after Japan has undergone the experience of being burned out with napalm and atom-bombed.

these columns are not uncharacteristic.² The Japanese emphasize home, children, parks and beaches; the Chinese emphasize industry, guns, international quarrels, the virility of the working class, the heroism of Mao Tse-tung and the power of the Chinese armed forces.

The almost-total change in the Asian political environment makes it hard to apply consistent and consecutive standards to the change of foreign policy which has occurred from within Japan itself.

The most elementary justice requires that militarist Japan be credited with its strange services to democracy in the last weeks of war. The Japanese field marshals and admirals had no reason to love revolution, democracy or parliamentarism, but it must be pointed out that in the critical last days of July and August, 1945, they did what they could to bring the Left to power in Korea, to consolidate Vietnamese independence against the French, to leave a functioning Indonesian state behind which might beat off a Dutch reoccupation, and to ensure a resistance to the return of British, Dutch and French power in South and Southeast Asia. They even tried to rescue or to pension their puppets, which is more than Hitler did when his local traitors followed him back into the ruins of *Grossdeutschland*.

The Japanese military scored a political victory over the West even in the agony of their own defeat; like a traditional samurai who, dying, stabs his enemy one last time, they helped *any* Asian they could against *any* European, even if the Asian were Left-wing and the non-Asian relatively conservative. The result is an odd impediment to Japanese-Asian relations: in Burma, in the Philippines, in Indonesia, in India and in various other countries, there are many Asian leaders who would rather not talk about Japan because they owe so much to the Japanese militarists of 16 years ago. They have no desire to discuss what the Japanese did for them, or to express gratitude to Japan, since it would disadvantage

² Philatelists may be interested in noting that the Japanese (issued 1948) is Scott 1961 catalog #406, Japan, while the Chinese one is the Southwest China issue of 1950, catalogued as Lipsia Volksrepublik China #830. Lipsia is, of course, the leading Soviet-bloc stamp catalogue—Anonymous, *Lipsia Briefmarkenkatalog*, Verlag Enzyklopädie, Leipzig, East Germany, 1960. The two stamps are therefore reasonably contemporary and show in fair terms the way the two countries are moving.

CHINESE AND JAPANESE STAMPS



This Japanese stamp shows the peaceful and purely domestic ideals which the post-war Japanese government continues to set before the Japanese people by all media of mass communication.



This Chinese Communist stamp (supplied by a Chinese Nationalist source) was issued early in the Communist regime. It shows the early emphasis on military manpower and is unusual in that it stresses both Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung, instead of the latter by himself.

them in their current careers. They therefore remain aloof when the subject of Japan is raised at all.

Japan's Relations with Asia

The Asian states themselves present a very mixed bag of policies on the matter of relations with Japan. Most implacable is Korea, where the Rhee regime maintained an unyielding attitude of hostility and provocation toward Japan as one of the measures designed to sustain its internal popularity; the new junta, in a very guarded way, is showing itself to be more conciliatory. The North Korean government has made no particular attempt to deal with Japan, but

achieved a de facto measure of cordiality when the Japanese repatriated a number of Korean expatriates to their territory rather than to the South.

The two governments of the one China show singularly friendly policies toward Japan. The Nationalist government, as the Republic of China, signed a peace treaty which left the Japanese free to deal with the other Chinese government too. Japan-Formosa relations flourish in the economic field; in the defense field, though no one says anything about the matter publicly, coordination has presumably reached a high level through the United States Sixth Fleet, shielding them both. Tough Nationalist China has many claims against Japan, particularly a claim on the Ryukyu Islands, the protests have been made *pro forma*; year by year economic relations and communications improve between the two countries.

Red China, on the other hand, has wooed and bullied Japan by turn. The Japanese have given Peking everything short of formal recognition. Semi-official Japanese delegations have visited the Red mainland in large numbers. Every time the Chinese Communists and the Japanese begin to draw together, the Communists commit some diplomatic or psychological blunder and drive the Japanese back into the American camp. Several years ago, it was the provocative Chinese interference in a Japanese election. Later it was Mikoyan hectoring the Japanese on their own soil. Most recently, it has been Russian callousness in conducting poisonous bomb tests not too far from Japan while the Red Chinese, who opposed atom bombs, said nothing in support of the Japanese protests.

Japanese connections with North Vietnam are minimal, partly because the country has been in a state of siege for so long that foreigners cannot be trusted in the harbors or capital city. With South Vietnam, as with Cambodia and Laos, the Japanese have representation and a modicum of trade. These countries show no particular anti-Japanese resentments; neither do they count on the Japanese for assistance in their quarrels with one another or with communism. It is as if they felt Japan had removed itself from the planet. The Japanese exorcised the last ghost of World War II in this area on

May 5, 1959, when they signed the last of their reparations agreements—the one with South Vietnam.

Indeed, the Japanese phased their reparations agreements to fit smoothly into their own economic program. The Japanese took part in the Colombo Plan economic programs, vigorously developing their trade with India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma and Malaya. Japanese trade with Indonesia, the Philippines, Hongkong and Singapore continued healthy. Not one of these countries can be said to have had a serious political or diplomatic goal concerning Japan. The keys to the contacts were economic; they have remained so. The sober, careful international policies of prime ministers Yoshida, Kishi and Ikeda bore fruit in the fact that there was nothing on which the other Asian states could attach a policy. The Indonesians might like to involve Japanese help in their dispute over Western New Guinea ("Irian Barat"), but the Japanese have given them no occasion for inviting or expecting such help.

Displacement of the Geographic Factor

The Asian states do not have "Japan policies" because Japan does nothing which calls for a policy on their part. This is one manifestation of the geographic displacement of both economics and politics which has occurred since World War II.

Ignorant or thoughtless persons often argue that Japan "must" deal with Red China because the two are close together on the map. Such considerations would make sense if the transport factor in international trade were as expensive and as risky as it was in the days of Marco Polo: the simple fact is that it is not. The ton-dollar or kilogram-yen element for a given area does not correspond to the distance on a map, least of all on a Mercator map; it depends on the cheapness and availability of transport, of which ocean cargo is still the cheapest and safest in the world. (Otherwise Australia and New Zealand, at the other end of the planet from London, could not have thrived with 150 years of dependence on Britain.) Japan is closer to the United States than it is to Red China, in terms of available shipping, dependable exchange rates and reliability of a market; it

is closer to China only in the lines on a map which the village idiot, seeing but not understanding what he saw, could trace with his finger. The Japanese disaster of 1941-1945 was based on the fallacy that short-haul ocean trips are a vital necessity, when in fact it costs only infinitesimally more to ship grain from Manitoba to Peking than it does to ship it from Kyushu to Peking.

The Japanese have become economically global in their outlook, and when they impinge on Asia, they do so with a world-wide outlook. The Japanese know that their United States market is the most important trade tie of them all, and they are eagerly seeking new markets in Latin America and Africa as well. Asia is important to them as a market, but not of any peculiar importance because it is Asian.

The Japanese and many of the Asian states find comfort, therefore, in the fact that there are not too many specifically "Asian" problems to settle. Insofar as issues characteristically Asian may exist—vestiges of colonialism, economic maldevelopment, racist resentments—they are taken up by the Asian-African bloc in which the Japanese play a very marginal role indeed. The last unequal treaties ceased to apply in Japan on June 30, 1899, so that few Japanese now living remember the semi-colonial status of past times. The Japanese are Asian in culture and location, but not in education, development or independence. The mere element of propinquity binding Japan and the Southeast Asian states is not so important as the ex-colonial status which the Southeast Asian states share with the new African nations. In that sense, Japan has outgrown Asia.

Cold War and Authentic Independence

Though Americans have much to be proud of, when they consider the surrender, occupation and evacuation of Japan, they may not realize that they have not yet found a way in which Japan can defend the United States. The security arrangements remain unbalanced so long as America is defending Japan without Japan entering into a full partnership, comparable to Nato, in which the Japanese are defending the Americans as well. (The author has long felt that the sharing of several Atlantic bases with the

Japanese would help redress the unbalance of a perpetual American protection of Japan, but this idea is not known in official circles.) As a result of the United States-Japanese security arrangements, Japan remains semi-dependent on the United States in many Asian eyes: even domestically there are stings of self-approach that the nation should remain under the military guardianship of a foreign people. The new version of the treaty, signed January 19, 1960, by Secretary Christian Herter and Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, ameliorated some of the unilateral features of the 1951 treaty, but the changes, while logical, were not emotionally persuasive. The Japanese did not *seem* to have full independence, though logically they possessed it; this led to the demonstrations of May and June, 1960, which caused cancellation of the projected Eisenhower visit. In the area of the tangibles, the United States had won; in the world of intangibles, it had lost again. The United States was as right, and as hopeless, as a man who suddenly becomes logical in the middle of a love affair.

The Japanese steered a fastidiously careful course between the sheer security which the treaty provided for them and the real independence available to them, diplomatically and economically, in Asia. Nowhere did the Japanese invoke American power or influence to their own interest. They kept a nice independence while accepting a security treaty which relieved their economy of many billions of yen in extra expenses. Japanese separateness from the United States permitted the continuation of the most nearly successful two-China policy of any power, preserved Japan from the incidental resentments generated by the United States-Pakistan relationship in Cento, and permitted an absolute Japanese neutrality in the Middle East. The Japanese were scrupulous to let their influence grow from the ground up. Outside of a few technical aid missions and mountain-climbing expeditions, the Japanese kept their national presence out of the Asian news. (Even the Japanese penetration of space with Japanese-designed rockets was soft-pedalled for fear that the world would realize that Japan was once again ahead of China in the sphere of para-

(Continued on p. 367)

Current Documents

Soviet-American Communiqué on Principles of Disarmament

On September 20, 1961, the United States and the U.S.S.R. issued a joint communiqué outlining their agreement on broad general principles for a disarmament program. The complete text of this communiqué follows:

Having conducted an extensive exchange of views on disarmament pursuant to their agreement announced in the General Assembly on March 30, 1961,

Noting with concern that the continuing arms race is a heavy burden for humanity and is fraught with dangers for the cause of world peace,

Reaffirming their adherence to all the provisions of the General Assembly Resolution 1378 (XIV) of November 20, 1959,

Affirming that to facilitate the attainment of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world it is important that all states abide by existing international agreements, refrain from any actions which might aggravate international tensions, and that they seek settlement of all disputes by peaceful means,

The United States and the U.S.S.R. have agreed to recommend the following principles as the basis for future multilateral negotiations on disarmament and to call upon other states to cooperate in reaching early agreement on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world in accordance with these principles.

[1]

The goal of negotiations is to achieve agreement on a program which will insure that

(a) Disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems and

(b) Such disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

[2]

The program for general and complete disarmament shall insure that states will have at their disposal only those non-nuclear armaments, forces, facilities, and establish-

ments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens; and that states shall support and provide agreed manpower for a U.N. peace force.

[3]

To this end, the program for general and complete disarmament shall contain the necessary provisions, with respect to the military establishment of every nation, for:

(a) Disbanding of armed forces, dismantling of military establishments, including bases, cessation of the production of armaments as well as their liquidation or conversion to peaceful uses;

(b) Elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological, and other weapons of mass destruction and cessation of the production of such weapons;

(c) Elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction;

(d) Abolishment of the organizations and institutions designed to organize the military effort of states, cessation of military training, and closing of all military training institutions;

(e) Discontinuance of military expenditures.

[4]

The disarmament program should be implemented in an agreed sequence, by stages until it is completed, with each measure and stage carried out within specified time limits. Transition to a subsequent stage in the process of disarmament should take place upon a review of the implementation of measures included in the preceding stage and upon a decision that all such measures have been implemented and verified and that any additional verification arrangements required for measures in the next stage are, when appropriate, ready to operate.

[5]

All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any state or group of states gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all.

[6]

All disarmament measures should be implemented from beginning to end under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are honoring their obligations. During and after the implementation of general and complete disarmament, the most thorough control should be exercised, the nature and extent of such control depending on the requirements for verification of the disarmament measures being carried out in each stage.

To implement control over and inspection of disarmament, an international disarmament organization including all parties to the agreement should be created within the framework of the United Nations. This international disarmament organization and its inspectors should be assured unrestricted access without veto to all places as necessary for the purpose of effective verification.

[7]

Progress in disarmament should be ac-

companied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. During and after the implementation of the program of general and complete disarmament, there should be taken, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security, including the obligation of states to place at the disposal of the United Nations agreed manpower necessary for an international peace force to be equipped with agreed types of armaments.

Arrangements for the use of this force should insure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

[8]

States participating in the negotiations should seek to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date. Efforts should continue without interruption until agreement upon the total program has been achieved, and efforts to insure early agreement on and implementation of measures of disarmament should be undertaken without prejudicing progress on agreement on the total program and in such a way that these measures would facilitate and form part of that program.

United States Disarmament Proposal

On September 25, 1961, President Kennedy outlined a new proposal for staged, general disarmament to the United Nations General Assembly. The complete text of the United States plan follows:

The nations of the world,

Conscious of the crisis in human history produced by the revolutionary development of modern weapons within a world divided by serious ideological differences;

Determined to save present and succeeding generations from the scourge of war and the dangers and burdens of the arms race and to create conditions in which all peoples can strive freely and peacefully to fulfill their basic aspirations;

Declare their goal to be: A free, secure,

and peaceful world of independent states adhering to common standards of justice and international conduct and subjecting the use of force to the rule of law; a world where adjustment to change takes place in accordance with the principles of the United Nations; a world where there shall be a permanent state of general and complete disarmament under effective international control and where the resources of nations shall be devoted to man's material, cultural and spiritual advance;

Set forth as the objectives of a program of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world:

(a) The disbanding of all national armed forces and the prohibition of their re-establishment in any form whatsoever other than those required to preserve internal order and for contributions to a United Nations Peace Force;

(b) The elimination from national arsenals of all armaments, including all weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery, other than those required for a United Nations Peace Force and for maintaining internal order;

(c) The establishment and effective operation of an International Disarmament Organization within the framework of the United Nations to ensure compliance at all times with all disarmament obligations;

(d) The institution of effective means for the enforcement of international agreements, for the settlement of disputes, and for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the United Nations.

Call on the negotiating states:

(a) To develop the outline program set forth below into an agreed plan for general and complete disarmament and to continue their efforts without interruption until the whole program has been achieved;

(b) To this end to seek to attain the widest possible area of agreement at the earliest possible date;

(c) Also to seek—without prejudice to progress on the disarmament program—agreement on those immediate measures that would contribute to the common security of nations and that could facilitate and form a part of that program.

Affirm that disarmament negotiations should be guided by the following principles:

(a) Disarmament shall take place as rapidly as possible until it is completed in stages containing balanced, phased and safeguarded measures, with each measure and stage to be carried out in an agreed period of time.

(b) Compliance with all disarmament obligations shall be effectively verified from their entry into force. Verification arrangements shall be instituted progressively and in such a manner as to verify not only that

agreed limitations or reductions take place but also that retained armed forces and armaments do not exceed agreed levels at any stage.

(c) Disarmament shall take place in a manner that will not affect adversely the security of any state, whether or not a party to an international agreement or treaty.

(d) As states relinquish their arms, the United Nations shall be progressively strengthened in order to improve its capacity to assure international security and the peaceful settlement of differences as well as to facilitate the development of international cooperation in common tasks for the benefit of mankind.

(e) Transition from one stage of disarmament to the next shall take place as soon as all the measures in the preceding stage have been carried out and effective verification is continuing and as soon as the arrangements that have been agreed to be necessary for the next stage have been instituted.

Agree upon the following outline program for achieving general and complete disarmament:

STAGE I

A. To Establish an International Disarmament Organization:

(a) An International Disarmament Organization (I.D.O.) shall be established within the framework of the United Nations upon entry into force of the agreement. Its functions shall be expanded progressively as required for the effective verification of the disarmament program.

(b) The I.D.O. shall have: (1) a general conference of all the parties; (2) a commission consisting of representatives of all the major powers as permanent members and certain other states on a rotating basis; and (3) an administrator who will administer the organization subject to the direction of the commission and who will have the authority, staff, and finances adequate to assure effective impartial implementation of the functions of the organization.

(c) The I.D.O. shall: (1) ensure compliance with the obligations undertaken by verifying the execution of measures agreed upon; (2) assist the states in developing the details of agreed further verification and dis-

armament measures; (3) provide for the establishment of such bodies as may be necessary for working out the details of further measures provided for in the program and for such other expert study groups as may be required to give continuous study to the problems; (4) receive reports on the progress of disarmament and verification arrangements and determine the transition from one stage to the next.

B. To Reduce Armed Forces and Armaments:

(a) Force levels shall be limited to 2,100,000 each for the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and to appropriate levels not exceeding 2,100,000 each for all other militarily significant states. Reductions to the agreed levels will proceed by equitable, proportionate, and verified steps.

(b) Levels of armaments of prescribed types shall be reduced by equitable and balanced steps. The reductions shall be accomplished by transfers of armaments to depots supervised by the I.D.O. When, at specified periods during the Stage I reduction process, the states party to the agreement have agreed that the armaments and armed forces are at prescribed levels, the armaments in depots shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

(c) The production of agreed types of armaments shall be limited.

(d) A Chemical, Biological, Radiological (C.B.R.) Experts Commission shall be established within the I.D.O. for the purpose of examining and reporting on the feasibility and means for accomplishing the verifiable reduction and eventual elimination of C.B.R. weapons stockpiles and the halting of their production.

C. To Contain and Reduce the Nuclear Threat:

(a) States that have not acceded to a treaty effectively prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons shall do so.

(b) The production of fissionable materials for use in weapons shall be stopped.

(c) Upon the cessation of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons, agreed initial quantities of fissionable materials from past production shall be transferred to non-weapons purposes.

(d) Any fissionable materials transferred between countries for peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall be subject to appropriate

safeguards to be developed in agreement with the I.A.E.A.

(e) States owning nuclear weapons shall not relinquish control of such weapons to any nation not owning them and shall not transmit to any such nation information or material necessary for their manufacture. States not owning nuclear weapons shall not manufacture such weapons, attempt to obtain control of such weapons belonging to other states, or seek or receive information or materials necessary for their manufacture.

(f) A Nuclear Experts Commission consisting of representatives of the nuclear states shall be established within the I.D.O. for the purpose of examining and reporting on the feasibility and means for accomplishing the verified reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles.

D. To Reduce Strategic Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicles:

(a) Strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles in specified categories and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be reduced to agreed levels by equitable and balanced steps. The reduction shall be accomplished in each step by transfers to depots supervised by the I.D.O. of vehicles that are in excess of levels agreed upon for each step. At specified periods during the Stage I reduction process, the vehicles that have been placed under supervision of the I.D.O. shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

(b) Production of agreed categories of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be discontinued or limited.

(c) Testing of agreed categories of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be limited or halted.

E. To Promote the Peaceful Use of Outer Space:

(a) The placing into orbit or stationing in outer space of weapons capable of producing mass destruction shall be prohibited.

(b) States shall give advance notification to participating states and to the I.D.O. of launching of space vehicles and missiles, together with the track of the vehicle.

F. To Reduce the Risks of War by Accident, Miscalculation and Surprise Attack:

(a) States shall give advance notification to the participating states and to the I.D.O. of major military movements and maneuvers, on a scale as may be agreed, which might give rise to misinterpretation or cause alarm and induce countermeasures. The notification shall include the geographic areas to be used and the nature, scale and time span of the event.

(b) There shall be established observation posts at such locations as major ports, railway centers, motor highways, and air bases to report on concentrations and movements of military forces.

(c) There shall also be established such additional inspection arrangements to reduce the danger of surprise attack as may be agreed.

(d) An international commission shall be established immediately within the I.D.O. to examine and make recommendations on the possibility of further measures to reduce the risks of nuclear war by accident, miscalculation, or failure of communication.

G. To Keep the Peace:

(a) States shall reaffirm their obligations under the U.N. Charter to refrain from the threat or use of any type of armed force—including nuclear, conventional, or C.B.R.—contrary to the principles of the U.N. Charter.

(b) States shall agree to refrain from indirect aggression and subversion against any country.

(c) States shall use all appropriate processes for the peaceful settlement of disputes and shall seek within the United Nations further arrangements for the peaceful settlement of international disputes and for the codification and progressive development of international law.

(d) States shall develop arrangements in Stage I for the establishment in Stage II of a U.N. Peace Force.

(e) A U.N. peace observation group shall be staffed with a standing cadre of observers who could be despatched to investigate any situation which might constitute a threat to or breach of the peace.

STAGE II

A. International Disarmament Organization:

The powers and responsibilities of the I.D.O. shall be progressively enlarged in order to give it the capabilities to verify the measures undertaken in Stage II.

B. To Further Reduce Armed Forces and Armaments:

(a) Levels of forces for the U.S., U.S.S.R., and other militarily significant states shall be further reduced by substantial amounts to agreed levels in equitable and balanced steps.

(b) Levels of armaments of prescribed types shall be further reduced by equitable and balanced steps. The reduction shall be accomplished by transfers of armaments to depots supervised by the I.D.O. When, at specified periods during the Stage II reduction process, the parties have agreed that the armaments and armed forces are at prescribed levels, the armaments in depots shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

(c) There shall be further agreed restrictions on the production of armaments.

(d) Agreed military bases and facilities wherever they are located shall be dismantled or converted to peaceful uses.

(e) Depending upon the findings of the Experts Commission on C.B.R. weapons, the production of C.B.R. weapons shall be halted, existing stocks progressively reduced, and the resulting excess quantities destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

C. To Further Reduce the Nuclear Threat:

Stocks of nuclear weapons shall be progressively reduced to the minimum levels which can be agreed upon as a result of the findings of the Nuclear Experts Commission; the resulting excess of fissionable material shall be transferred to peaceful purposes.

D. To Further Reduce Strategic Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicles:

Further reductions in the stocks of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be carried out in accordance with the procedure outlined in Stage I.

E. To Keep the Peace:

During Stage II, states shall develop further the peace-keeping processes of the

United Nations, to the end that the United Nations can effectively in Stage III deter or suppress any threat or use of force in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations:

(a) States shall agree upon strengthening the structure, authority, and operation of the United Nations so as to assure that the United Nations will be able effectively to protect states against threats to or breaches of the peace.

(b) The U.N. Peace Force shall be established and progressively strengthened.

(c) States shall also agree upon further improvements and developments in rules of international conduct and in processes for peaceful settlement of disputes and differences.

STAGE III

By the time Stage II has been completed, the confidence produced through a verified disarmament program, the acceptance of rules of peaceful international behavior, and the development of strengthened international peace-keeping processes within the framework of the U.N. should have reached a point where the states of the world can move forward to Stage III.

In Stage III, progressive controlled disarmament and continuously developing principles and procedures of international law

would proceed to a point where no state would have the military power to challenge the progressively strengthened U.N. Peace Force and all international disputes would be settled according to the agreed principles of international conduct.

The progressive steps to be taken during the final phase of the disarmament program would be directed toward the attainment of a world in which:

(a) States would retain only those forces, non-nuclear armaments, and establishments required for the purpose of maintaining internal order; they would also support and provide agreed manpower for a U.N. Peace Force.

(b) The U.N. Peace Force, equipped with agreed types and quantities of armaments, would be fully functioning.

(c) The manufacture of armaments would be prohibited except for those of agreed types and quantities to be used by the U.N. Peace Force and those required to maintain internal order. All other armaments would be destroyed or converted to peaceful purposes.

(d) The peace-keeping capabilities of the United Nations would be sufficiently strong and the obligations of all states under such arrangements sufficiently far-reaching as to assure peace and the just settlement of differences in a disarmed world.

stead of being an antidote to communism. While inexperienced politicians are arguing among themselves, the crafty Communists will move in quietly and trap them all.

As democracy cannot be successfully adopted by Korea or any other country infested with communism, we should recognize that our own system of government is no panacea for all peoples in all kinds of weather. With this sober realization, we should do what we can in helping the Asian leaders to set up the kind of government that will work in their countries instead of trying to impose democracy which will only aid the Communist cause. I think the old proverb which says, "We must walk even with the devil until we cross the bridge" may be a realistic policy to pursue until we have overcome the fanatical Communist drive for world domination.

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did not work, let alone produce miracles. On the contrary, they aided the Communists like tons of atom bombs would have.

Thanks to democratic rights and freedoms, the Communists were freer than ever to stir up hostilities and to carry out fifth column activities against the Nationalists, to defy and attack their enemies without observing any rules of fair play. The Nationalists handicapped by the restrictions imposed on them in the name of democracy, were unable to cope with the hostile propaganda and subversive activities of the Communists. This was one of the main reasons why the Nationalists lost the battle for survival in China.

If there is a fair chance of success, it would be wise to introduce democracy everywhere at all times. But in the prevailing state of affairs in Asia today, democracy will be little more than a mockery to the Communists in-

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History and Politics . . .

RED CHINA: AN ASIAN VIEW. By SRIPATI CHANDRA-SEKHAR. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961. 230 pages, \$4.00.)

Communist China has passed the cross-roads. She has committed herself to a domestic policy that would attain all the benefits and services that a modern, industrial and centralized state can secure for its citizens; and given the nature of her present political orientation and philosophy whatever means are employed to this end become relatively irrelevant in the light of over-riding national objectives. Despite a certain oversensitiveness to foreign criticisms Peking has continually invited selected guests to visit the country and draw comparisons between the old and the new China. One of the distinguished Asian observers who partook of this special privilege was Mr. Chandra-Sekhar, Director of the Indian Institute for Population Studies, who in the space of a few months in 1958-1959 went to numerous villages and factories investigating the effects that Communist orthodoxies and priorities have had on individual and family patterns in what had once been one of the oldest of conservative societies.

What he has observed is fascinating and frightening, full of ominous portent for other underdeveloped nations. China, he finds, is changing in all aspects of life from public attitudes on health to present-day conceptions on education. Nothing is left to individual initiative any more with the result that party control tends to reach into every aspect of society. Literally no individual action in any field is reserved to the vagaries of chance. The communes become a case in point. In order to satisfy the current internal ideological orientation, the communes' essential function has become to "convert the peasants into a working class," for by collectivizing the last vestiges of privately held land, and

by substituting in its stead a wage system on the farm, the state has created a new breed of proletarians whose psychological and material dependence upon the Party serves to weaken the farmers' natural resistance to change.

With perceptiveness and care the author evaluates the recent "great leap" forward and the effect this policy has had in a variety of social areas. By striving to remain impartial and receptive to all types of information tendered to him by his official guides and interpreters, he has succeeded in giving a well-balanced and informed account, full of intriguing insights of a China that is developing politically and industrially at her own pace and on her own terms irrespective of the image she presents to her neighbors in Asia and the world at large.

RENE PERITZ
University of Pennsylvania

THE DIPLOMACY OF THE GREAT POWERS. By SIR WILLIAM HAYTER. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1961. 74 pages, \$2.75.)

At a time when most writing in the field of political science has become tiresome and boorish, consisting of charts, graphs, and statistics, but few ideas, it is indeed refreshing to read this small volume, literally brimming over with important and perceptive thoughts about one of the most difficult of governmental arts—diplomacy. Sir William fortunately is able to phrase his thoughts with considerable style, another difficult art that seems to have been drowned in a sea of pseudo-scientific jargon under the aegis of the social sciences.

Sir William comments on the quality and nature of the diplomacy of Britain, the United States, France, and the Soviet Union, and, in a delightful manner, on the atmosphere of the national capitals of these Powers. American diplomacy is far better than could be expected, supported by able men in the field and by a State

Department that is probably better informed than any Foreign Ministry. Unfortunately, Sir William finds it hindered by restraints rooted in American myths and values and in our governmental system so that leadership is often absent.

The British benefit from their traditional experience and flexible approach in maintaining their national interests, but suffer today from inadequate power. The French, on the other hand, mindful of their lack of power, make up for it through the personal brilliance of their diplomats and the universal appeal of French culture in their social relations in foreign capitals.

The Soviets have not produced good diplomats since the late 1930's. In place of such able men as Maisky and Troyanovsky, "ex-revolutionary conspirators"

and "internationalist by outlook"—most of whom were Jewish—came the "iron civil servant" of the Molotov school, mostly Great Russians, "generally of peasant or working-class stock—technically very able, socially somewhat clumsy."

As for the United Nations, Sir William concludes that it is not a place for "Great Power diplomacy but for anti-Great Power diplomacy," an increasingly evident development, particularly in the last year.

The great value of this little book is that it is written by an experienced diplomat, in a casually elegant style, giving the reader unique and pertinent information that is seldom present in more pretentious and lengthy academic studies.

J. ROFFE WIKE, II
University of Pennsylvania

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military technology; the Japanese space probes were the quietest events of the year in the field of world weaponry, since the Japanese labelled them "peaceful" and "scientific.")

Most successful of all was Japan's avoidance of any new showdown with Red China. It is more convenient for the Chinese Communists to attack the United States, verbally, than to attack any other power, since they can be absolutely sure that Americans, being Americans, will not strike back at them; the leaders in Peking welcome an utterly safe enemy whom they can use while whipping their mismanaged masses into even more exhausting efforts. Japanese leadership is aware that a militarist China now seeks domination of the same Far East which militarist Japan sought 20 years ago, but the Japanese are willing to avoid the waste and the glory of direct competition with China. It is easier not to lead "Asia" than it is to lead it; the Japanese know, because their generals once tried the job.

Not having a specific mission in Asia until they have full military status among the powers, not wanting full military status until that problematical time in which their science or their economy can bring power within easy range, not being committed to a strategy of defending themselves, since the United States guarantees to do it for them

and to pay for it, the Japanese are passingly one of the free nations of the world. By having just exactly the right commitments, they have become uncommitted. Some sophisticated Asian leaders, including Japanese, realize this.

The Japanese can afford a strong moral and political commitment to the United Nations because the United Nations has already fought one war in defense of them in Korea. The position of Japan is unique in Asia. In the course of time, the Japanese may wish to move from the passive voice to the active in their diplomatic speech. Meanwhile, they still walk softly: other people have the big sticks. The Japanese leaders come from a sophisticated tradition with a great deal of military wisdom. Only a fool speaks loudly without weapons when he stands among quarreling men.

The Japanese return to power is something which must grow with events, with science, and with economic capacity; meanwhile, the Japanese are establishing themselves as the acquaintances, if not the friends, of every nation in Asia. The United Nations is to them no mere expedient; it is a wise recourse for a people whose governments have received defeat and ingratitude in many parts of Asia. By speaking in the United Nations, and speaking quietly, Japan can address the world and Asia too.

The Month in Review

INTERNATIONAL

Berlin Crisis

Oct. 1—Communist East German police, militia and members of the youth organization clear and widen the strip of land on their side of the barbed-wire border separating East Berlin from West Berlin.

Oct. 6—Premier Khrushchev, in a message to Communist leader Walter Ulbricht of East Germany, declares that the U.S.S.R. will sign a peace treaty very soon with East Germany. Ulbricht declares that East-West "special agreements on the peaceful settlement of the West Berlin issue" must be reached before "a peace treaty is concluded." These agreements could then be made "part and parcel of the peace treaty."

U.S. President Kennedy and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko discuss the Berlin crisis. Kennedy later comments that Gromyko "offered to trade us an apple for an orchard."

Oct. 9—U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk confers with U.S. Ambassador to West Germany Walter C. Dowling and U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr.

Oct. 10—West German sources disclose that 50,000 Soviet and 10,000 Polish troops have massed in East Germany to carry out Warsaw Pact maneuvers.

Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko meets in London with British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and Foreign Secretary Lord Home.

Oct. 13—Nine East German youths, in a stolen truck, crash the East Berlin barricades and escape to freedom in West Berlin. East German submachine guns fire about 250 shots over the wall into West Berlin; no one is hurt.

Oct. 15—The U.S. State Department reports that a projected meeting of senior diplomats of the Western Big Four in London has been dropped. Instead, Berlin experts from the Big Four governments will attend the Big Four ambassadorial talks in process in Washington.

Oct. 22—Nine U.S. military police escort U.S. diplomat E. Allan Lightner, Jr., assistant chief of the U.S. mission in West Germany, into the East Berlin sector. Lightner was stopped by East Germany border guards, when he refused to show his identification papers. A U.S. spokesman declares that the escort was ordered "to prove" Lightner's "right of passage."

Oct. 23—Western guards on the Berlin border are equipped with submachine guns and tear gas grenades.

Oct. 25—The U.S. State Department announces that the Soviet commander in Berlin has rejected a protest by the U.S. commander in Berlin. The U.S. commander insists on free entry to East Berlin.

Oct. 26—33 Soviet tanks operated by Soviet soldiers move into East Berlin's center. For the third time in 5 days, U.S. officials in civilian clothes entering East Berlin use military escorts to assure entry. East Germany has demanded that such officials present identity papers to East German border guards.

Oct. 27—Soviet and U.S. tanks confront each other across the 100-yard Friedrichstrasse crossing point between East and West Berlin.

U.S. Ambassador Thompson tells the U.S.S.R. that the U.S. insists that free entry to East Berlin be restored for U.S. citizens.

Oct. 28—Authoritative sources in Bonn disclose that West Germany is willing to sign non-aggression pacts with the Communist bloc, including East Germany.

U.S. and Soviet tanks draw back from the Friedrichstrasse crossing point.

Oct. 30—The U.S. army halts military police patrols along the autobahn connecting East Berlin with West Germany. The patrols had been policing the 110-mile autobahn since September 22.

Oct. 31—West Berlin officials report that 1,700 West Berliners have left the city since the East-West Berlin border was closed.

International Atomic Energy Agency

Oct. 3—The Agency confirms the appoint-

ment of Arne Sigvard Eklund of Sweden as Director General.

Oct. 6—The head of the Soviet Atomic Energy Authority leaves the general conference of the International Atomic Energy in protest against the installation of Eklund as Director.

United Nations (See also Congo.)

Oct. 1—An official report reveals that \$118,182,018 in unpaid bills is owed to the United Nations.

Oct. 3—Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs Howard C. Green asks the General Assembly to "insist" that nuclear testing end.

Oct. 11—Voting 67 to 1, the General Assembly censures South Africa for a speech its delegate made defending its racial policies.

Oct. 12—Burmese statesman U Thant, leading candidate for the post of Acting Secretary General, suggests 5 United Nations officials as his assistants.

Oct. 17—Pledges of funds for economic aid are made by 74 nations; the total is \$97,685,000.

Oct. 20—Denmark, Canada, Iceland, Japan, Norway, and Sweden ask Russia to cancel its projected 50-megaton test.

Oct. 23—South African Foreign Minister Eric H. Louw charges in the General Assembly's Political Committee that the accusations against his country are "false and totally baseless."

Oct. 25—The Security Council approves the membership application of Outer Mongolia and Mauritania for membership.

The Political Committee asks Russia to cancel its projected 50-megaton test.

Oct. 26—An inquiry committee recommends the immediate termination of the South African mandate to rule South-West Africa.

The General Assembly agrees to investigate the causes of the death of Dag Hammarskjold.

Oct. 27—The General Assembly votes to admit Outer Mongolia and Mauritania to membership.

Oct. 30—Ghana, Ireland and Venezuela are elected to the Security Council as non-permanent members; the fourth seat is in dispute between the Philippines and Romania.

West Europe

Oct. 10—Edward Heath, Britain's Lord Privy Seal, says Britain is ready "fully to subscribe to the aims and objectives" of the Common Market.

Oct. 19—Representatives of Austria, Switzerland and Sweden say that in December they will officially announce their intention to associate themselves in some way with the Common Market.

Oct. 20—The European Parliamentary Assembly, made up of delegates from the Common Market countries, votes to merge the Coal and Steel Community and the European Community of Atomic Energy with the Common Market. The European Council of Ministers must now approve the plan.

ALBANIA (See also U.S.S.R.)

Oct. 21—It is reported that last night the Tirana radio broadcast a rebuttal of Soviet criticisms of Albania.

BELGIUM**Ruanda-Urundi**

Oct. 14—It is reported that Urundi's Premier, Crown Prince Louis Rwangasore, was assassinated last night.

Oct. 20—The lower house of parliament elects André Muhiirwa, brother-in-law of the late premier, to the premiership.

Oct. 26—Gregoire Kayibanda is elected president of Ruanda by the legislative council.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH**Australia**

Oct. 26—Territories Minister Paul M. C. Hasluck announces a 5-year plan to develop Papua and New Guinea, starting next year.

Ghana

Oct. 3—The Government reveals that 48 persons have been arrested for clandestine and dangerous activities.

Oct. 14—The Government reveals that 4 parliament members now under arrest have lost their seats.

Oct. 20—President Kennedy appoints Clarence B. Randall to lead a special mission investigating the prospect of U.S. aid for Ghana's Volta River project. The U.S. is concerned about an apparent leftward turn in Ghanaian policies.

Oct. 25—Alex Quaison-Sackey, head of Ghana's U.N. delegation, suggests that

the Security Council discuss the expulsion of South Africa from the U.N. Oct. 30—Parliament passes a bill providing special courts for political offenses; the death penalty can be invoked by this court.

Great Britain

Oct. 2—Prime Minister Harold Macmillan writes the President of the Common Market Council, Ludwig Erhard, notifying him that Britain will begin formal negotiations in Paris October 10 on the possibility of her entry into the Common Market. Oct. 3—Antony Armstrong-Jones, husband of Princess Margaret, becomes Viscount Linley and Earl of Snowdon. Oct. 9—Iain Macleod is named Leader of the House of Commons and chairman of the Conservative party, succeeding R. A. Butler. Reginald Maulding becomes Colonial Secretary. Frederick J. Erroll is President of the Board of Trade, replacing Maulding in that post. Oct. 31—Prime Minister Macmillan says that Britain and the U.S. are prepared to test anti-missile missiles and other nuclear weapons if necessary to prevent aggression. Queen Elizabeth II opens Parliament.

India

Oct. 1—Sikh leader Master Tara Singh ends his fast; a counter fast by Hindu leader Yogi Surya Deva will end tomorrow. Master Tara Singh fasted to support Sikh requests for a Punjabi-speaking state. The Sikhs accept Nehru's offer to establish a commission to look into charges of discrimination against the Sikhs. Oct. 7—Hindu-Muslim clashes kill at least 19 and injure some 81 persons in Uttar Pradesh. Oct. 9—General amnesty is granted by the government of Punjab to some 1,000 Communists arrested during the campaign for a Punjabi-speaking state.

Malaya

Oct. 16—Prime Minister Tengku Abdul Rahman tells Parliament Britain will not be allowed to use Singapore as a Seato defense base after the merger of Malaya and Singapore. Oct. 18—By overwhelming voice vote, Parliament approves Tengku Abdul Rahman's plan for the creation of a Greater Malaysia.

Pakistan

Oct. 2—President Mohammad Ayub Khan says Pakistan will resist the "thoroughly unreasonable" demands of Afghanistan. Oct. 4—It is revealed in Washington that the U.S. has offered to mediate between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Oct. 14—The U.S. reveals an agreement to provide \$621,550,000 in agricultural commodities for Pakistan over the next 4 years. Payments will be made by Pakistan in Pakistan currency; these will finance further aid.

BRITISH EMPIRE

British Guiana

Oct. 23—Prime Minister Cheddi B. Jagan meets with U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk in Washington. Oct. 25—Jagan confers with U.S. President Kennedy.

Jamaica

Oct. 5—The Colonial Office in London announces that Jamaica will become independent in 1962 and that Britain will sponsor Jamaica for Commonwealth membership.

Kenya

Oct. 6—In Nairobi, constitutional talks on coalition government for Kenya break down.

Malta

Oct. 24—A new constitution is promulgated for Malta. An elected 50-seat Legislature will choose a Prime Minister and Cabinet. A Crown-appointed Governor will control the Maltese police force. A High Commissioner will hold "concurrent" authority with the Legislature on foreign affairs and defense.

Tanganyika

Oct. 11—The Trusteeship Committee of the U.N. General Assembly recommends U.N. membership for Tanganyika when it attains independence December 9.

Uganda

Oct. 9—A communiqué issued by the Colonial Office reveals that Uganda will receive full independence October 9, 1962. Elections are planned for mid-April, 1962.

BURMA

Oct. 13—The Peking radio announces that Communist China and Burma have signed a protocol, which is an annex to their boundary agreement signed last year. The

protocol states that the joint Burmese-Chinese border committee successfully defined the joint Burmese-Chinese border and has marked off the boundaries.

CAMBODIA

Oct. 23—Cambodia cancels diplomatic relations with Thailand.

Oct. 26—The International Control Commission says there is no basis to the Thai charge that Cambodia plans aggression against Thailand.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF

Oct. 1—The Communist Chinese regime celebrates its twelfth year of rule.

Oct. 2—In Peking, Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos Torrado and Red Chinese chief of state Liu Shao-chi sign a communiqué in which they support each other's policies and condemn U.S. imperialism.

Oct. 11—In a 3-hour talk with Reuters General Manager Walton A. Cole, Communist Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi, it is reported, declared that his country is willing to hold top-level ministerial meetings with the U.S. to reduce misunderstanding between the 2 nations.

Oct. 12—*Hsinhua* (Chinese Communist press agency) reports that Nepal and Communist China have resolved their dispute over sovereignty over Mount Everest; their joint boundary now runs through Mt. Everest.

Oct. 23—Communist Chinese Premier Chou En-lai leaves the Moscow meeting for China and places his delegation under his deputy, Peng Chen. (See also *U.S.S.R.*)

Oct. 26—*Jenmin Jih Pao* (Chinese Communist party organ) publishes the texts of Khrushchev's denunciation of Albania and Albania's rebuttals.

COLOMBIA

Oct. 11—President Alberto Lleras Camargo declares a state of siege.

**CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE
(Leopoldville)**

Oct. 2—The deadlock between U.N. officials and delegates from secessionist Katanga Province continues over the question of white Belgian officials in the province. Katanga Foreign Affairs Minister Everiste Kimba reasserts his province's position that the issue is dead; Katanga eliminated all white mercenaries on August 28. The

U.N. declares that there are many whites still among the Katanga troops.

Oct. 4—U.N. Representative to the Congo Mahmoud Khiari leaves Katanga Province after negotiations with Katanga President Moise Tshombe prove fruitless.

Oct. 7—Dr. Sture C. Linner, the officer in charge of U.N. operations in the Congo, reports at U.N. headquarters in New York that negotiations with Katanga have proved useless because of the Province's unreasonable conditions.

Oct. 14—"A protocol implementation of the cease-fire that was agreed on September 21" is announced. This new agreement, reached by U.N. and Katanga officials, provides for an exchange of prisoners; the U.N. will also withdraw troops from several points in Katanga. The agreement orders the creation of 3 subcommissions, each with 2 Katanga and 2 U.N. delegates, to inspect any possible violations of the cease-fire.

Oct. 15—Premier Cyrille Adoula of the Congolese central government criticizes the U.N.-Katanga cease-fire agreement.

Oct. 16—The U.N. announces that it can only continue its military operations in the Congo for 2 more weeks unless \$20 million is appropriated.

Oct. 18—Africans in the 18-nation U.N. Advisory Committee on the Congo argue against ratification of the cease-fire agreement because such ratification would imply recognition of the secessionist Katanga regime.

Oct. 24—The six U.N. officials who served as advisors on the Congo to the late U.N. Secretary Dag Hammarskjold ratify the cease-fire agreement reached between the U.N. and Katanga.

Oct. 25—It is announced that the U.N. and Katanga have exchanged prisoners. The U.N. withdraws its troops from all positions in Katanga.

Oct. 30—The U.N. General Assembly approves appropriations to keep the U.N. Congo force operating through the end of 1961.

Premier Cyrille Adoula declares that central government troops have been sent in to end Katanga's secession. The U.N. reports that Katanga planes have bombed villages and railroad lines along the Kasai-

Katanga border in violation of the cease-fire.

Oct. 31—U.N. jet planes patrol the Kasai-Katanga border to prevent any further outbreaks.

CUBA

Oct. 4—Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos Torrado, in Moscow, reports that he has arranged for the sale of 4,860,000 tons of Cuban sugar annually to Communist nations in Europe and Asia, for the years 1962-1965.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Oct. 2—President Joaquin Balaguer addresses the United Nations General Assembly. He asks that the economic sanctions imposed by the O.A.S. last August on his country be lifted, and declares that he is trying to establish a more democratic government in the Dominican Republic.

Oct. 17—President Balaguer orders the closure of Santo Domingo University for the rest of the year.

Oct. 18—Anti-government rioting continues into its third day. The rioting was sparked by the closure of the University of Santo Domingo in response to students' demand for the removal of the University's rector.

Oct. 30—General Rafael L. Trujillo, Jr., declares that he only offered to resign as chief of the armed forces if the O.A.S. lifted its sanctions against the Dominican Republic. Some members of the Trujillo family, it is reported, have already left the country, a condition laid down by the Opposition groups before they will form a coalition government.

FINLAND (See also U.S. Foreign Policy.)

Oct. 10—President Urho K. Kekkonen departs on a 3-week tour of the U.S. and Canada.

FRANCE

Oct. 2—President Charles de Gaulle, in a radio and television broadcast, affirms his policy of self-determination for Algeria. He again offers to negotiate an Algerian peace with Algerian rebels.

Oct. 3—Parliament opens its fall session.

Oct. 16—The fourth French development plan since 1948 is published. It calls for a 24 per cent increase in production in all fields from 1962-1965.

Oct. 26—A 24-hour strike by workers in the government-run train and airline facilities begins. Bus and subway workers in the greater Paris metropolitan area also stage a 24-hour walkout.

FRANCE OVERSEAS

Algeria

Oct. 2—In Algiers Right-wing ultras stage a half-hour strike to protest de Gaulle's Algerian policy.

Oct. 4—Brigadier General Admed Rafa is given command of all French infantry forces in Algeria. Rafa is the only Muslim Algerian general officer in the French Army.

Oct. 17—In the most serious riot since the Algerian war began in 1954, Algerian Muslims clash with French police and security forces in Paris streets. The rioting lasts for 4 hours. The demonstration is staged to protest a curfew imposed on Muslims in the metropolitan area 12 days ago. The curfew orders Muslims off the streets between 8:30 p.m. and 5:30 a.m. Muslim cafes are closed at 7:00 p.m.

Oct. 18—The French government declares that some 1,500 Muslim rioters will be deported to their residence in Algeria. Minister Delegate Louis Terrenoire states that some 30,000 Muslims participated in the rioting last night, and a total of 11,538 were arrested.

Oct. 24—Algerian rebel Premier Benyoussef Ben Khedda calls for independence for Algeria without a referendum on self-determination for Algeria. He urges that independence and a cease-fire in Algeria be proclaimed simultaneously.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

Oct. 1—The delayed election in the Cochem District results in another Bundestag seat each for the Christian Democratic Union and the Free Democratic party. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's C.D.U. now has 242 seats; the Social Democratic party, 190; the Free Democratic party, 67.

Oct. 14—Adenauer receives a personal letter from U.S. President Kennedy on the Berlin crisis (see also *Int'l., Berlin Crisis*).

Oct. 17—Adenauer tells the C.D.U. parliamentary group that it can either give him its support or replace him. He refuses to share the chancellorship with Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard.

Oct. 20—The C.D.U. and the Free Demo-

cratic party agree on the terms for a coalition government. The Free Democratic party congress must vote its approval of the terms.

Oct. 21—The West German government launches the first submarine built since 1945, a 350-ton U-1.

The Free Democratic congress refuses to ratify the terms for a coalition government unless Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano is replaced.

Oct. 28—It is reported in London that the West German government will purchase U.S. military equipment, maintenance facilities and supplies. The purchase will cost \$600 million and will help ease the U.S. balance of payments deficit.

Oct. 30—Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano resigns. Adenauer accepts the resignation.

GREECE

Oct. 29—Greek voters go to the polls to elect a new parliament.

Oct. 30—with almost all the returns in, it is announced that Premier Constantine Caramanlis and his National Radical Union party have won 49.6 per cent of the votes so far.

INDONESIA

Oct. 9—Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio tells the U.N. General Assembly that his country opposes the Netherlands' plan to grant New Guinea (West Irian) independence under the supervision of the U.N.

IRAN

Oct. 7—Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi gives his properties along the Caspian Sea coast to 4,300 peasant families.

Oct. 11—The Shah and Queen Farah arrive in France for a 3-day state visit.

IRAQ

Oct. 12—The Iraqi government announces that talks between the government and Iraq Petroleum Company representatives have broken down. Negotiations have taken place intermittently since 1958.

IRELAND

Oct. 4—Irish voters elect a new parliament (Dail Eireann).

Oct. 6—Election results give Prime Minister Sean Lemass and his Fianna Fail party 70 seats in the 144-seat parliament. This is 3 short of a majority. Fine Gael, the

largest opposition party, gains 6 seats for a total of 47.

Oct. 11—The new parliament meets and elects Lemass prime minister.

ISRAEL

Oct. 31—A coalition government headed by David Ben-Gurion has been agreed on by leaders of 4 parties: the Mapai party, National Religious Front, Ahdut Avodah, and Poalei Agudat Israel.

JAPAN

Oct. 28—In a note to the Soviet Union, Premier Hayato Ikeda criticizes the Soviet Union for resuming nuclear testing.

JORDAN

Oct. 19—In a parliamentary election, 10 per cent of the voters cast ballots.

KOREA, SOUTH

Oct. 23—The government arrests Lieutenant General Chang Do Young and 25 of his military supporters for engaging in anti-revolutionary activity.

LAOS

Oct. 6—Right-wing Premier Prince Boun Oum, neutralist Prince Souvanna Phouma, and pro-Communist Prince Souphanouvong meet to discuss a coalition government for Laos.

Oct. 8—Prince Souvanna Phouma announces that he has been chosen as premier to head a new provisional coalition government for Laos.

Oct. 18—King Savang Vathana asks Phouma to form a new government for Laos. Phouma declares that Boun Oum will remain in the premiership until a new coalition government has been agreed on by neutralists, Communists and Right-wingers.

LEBANON

Oct. 23—Premier Saeb Salaam presents the resignation of his cabinet to President Fouad Chehab. Salaam declares he will resign formally tomorrow.

Oct. 25—Ex-Premier Rachid Karamé agrees to try to form a new government at the request of the President.

NETHERLANDS, THE

Oct. 12—Two Soviet attachés are asked to leave the Netherlands following a fight over custody of a Soviet woman whose husband defected to the Netherlands.

Oct. 13—The Soviet Union recalls its am-

bassador to the Netherlands and demands the withdrawal of the Dutch ambassador to Moscow.

PANAMA

Oct. 1—President Roberto F. Chiari, in his annual message to the National Assembly, declares that he has formally requested the U.S. to revise the Panama Canal Zone treaty, and give Panama rights over the Zone.

PERU

Oct. 23—The Inter-American Development Bank announces that a \$22.8 million loan for a housing program for Peru has been granted. The money will help finance some 32,000 low-income housing units.

SOUTH AFRICA, REPUBLIC OF (See also *Sweden*.)

Oct. 18—South Africans vote for a new parliament.

Oct. 19—Returns from the election give Prime Minister Hendrik F. Verwoerd and his Nationalist party a 10 per cent gain over the 1958 general election. The Nationalists gain 3 seats in the House of Assembly for a total of 105 seats.

Oct. 20—Prime Minister Verwoerd declares he will continue to carry out his white supremacy policies.

SPAIN

Oct. 1—Generalissimo Francisco Franco reviews a parade by 8,000 troops to mark the twenty-fifth anniversary of his rule.

SUDAN

Oct. 6—in the U.S. for a state visit, President Ibrahim Abboud issues a joint statement with President Kennedy after their meeting today.

SWEDEN

Oct. 19—Dr. Georg von Békésy, senior research fellow in psychophysics at Harvard University, is chosen to receive the 1961 Nobel Prize in Medicine, for his work on hearing.

Oct. 23—The late U.N. Secretary Dag Hammarskjöld is awarded the 1961 Nobel Peace Prize. The 1960 peace prize, withheld last year, is belatedly awarded to South Africa's Zulu Chief Albert John Luthuli.

Oct. 26—Yugoslav Ivo Andrić wins the 1961

Nobel Prize for Literature. He is the author of "The Bridge on the Drina."

SYRIA

Oct. 5—President Gamal Abdel Nasser declares, in a radio broadcast, that he does not intend to win back Syria either by force or by other means.

Oct. 7—The U.S.S.R. recognizes the new Syrian government.

Oct. 10—The U.S. formally recognizes the new Syrian government.

Oct. 13—Syria reoccupies her seat at the U.N., which she gave up when she merged with the U.A.R.

THAILAND

Oct. 24—Thailand closes off its border with Cambodia after Cambodia cancels diplomatic ties with Thailand.

TUNISIA

Oct. 1—France begins to withdraw its troops from Bizerte.

Oct. 9—Tunisia frees 24 Frenchmen arrested during the crisis over Bizerte.

Oct. 12—President Habib Bourguiba tells the National Assembly that he has informed France that unless France agrees to evacuate its Bizerte base, the fight over Bizerte will be resumed.

TURKEY

Oct. 15—Elections for the new Turkish parliament are held, signalling the transfer of government control from the military to civilian hands.

Oct. 20—Official returns from the elections give the People's Republic party 173 seats in the Assembly; the Justice party, 158; the New Turkey party, 65; and the Republican Peasants Nation party, 54. In the Senate, the People's Republican party wins 36 seats; the Justice party, 70; the New Turkey party, 28; and the Republican Peasants Nation party, 16.

Oct. 23—It is reported that the 4 parties have agreed to form a coalition government.

Oct. 24—It is reported that political party leaders have agreed to the military junta's demand that General Cemal Gürsel be elected president by the new parliament.

Oct. 25—The newly-elected parliament convenes. 450 Deputies and 172 (22 appointees) Senators are invested.

Oct. 26—The Parliament elects Gursel to the presidency. He is sworn in.

U.S.S.R., THE

Oct. 2—The Soviet Union sets off its sixteenth nuclear test since September 1.

Oct. 3—Peace marchers who trekked from San Francisco for some 10 months reach Moscow. The Soviet government prohibits the 13 marchers from making speeches on disarmament.

Oct. 7—The Moscow radio announces that the Soviet Union has successfully fired a multi-stage rocket about 7,500 miles into the Central Pacific.

Oct. 12—In a letter to 59 British Labor M.P.'s from Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, distributed by *Tass* (Soviet press agency), Khrushchev calls for the withdrawal of both Eastern and Western troops from Central Europe as part of a Berlin and German settlement (See also *Int'l., Berlin Crisis.*)

Oct. 14—The Communist party's Central Committee, in plenary session, adopts a revised version of the party's draft program and statutes.

Oct. 17—The twenty-second congress of the Soviet Communist party opens in Moscow. In attendance are 4,008 voting delegates, 405 consultative delegates, and representatives from 83 foreign nations.

In the opening address of the 22nd congress of the C.P.S.U., Khrushchev declares he will cancel his deadline for an East German peace treaty in 1961 if the Western Powers are ready to negotiate on Berlin and Germany. In his speech lasting over six hours, Khrushchev also declares that the U.S.S.R. will terminate its series of nuclear tests this month with the testing of a 50-megaton hydrogen bomb.

Premier Khrushchev tells the 22nd party congress that Albanian leaders are following a Stalinist course, in opposition to the de-Stalinization program under way in the U.S.S.R. Albania is not at the conference.

Marshal Kliment Y. Voroshilov, former Soviet chief of state, is elected to the presidium of the 22nd party congress. Later, Khrushchev denounces Voroshilov as one of the leaders of the anti-Khrushchev group ousted in 1957.

Oct. 18—Khrushchev presents the third program of the C.P.S.U. to the congress.

It is reported that last night Albania was expelled from the international Communist movement.

Oct. 19—Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai addresses the Soviet congress. He criticizes Khrushchev for his public denunciation of Albania and declares that all rifts in the Communist bloc should be healed "through bilateral contacts."

Oct. 20—Communist leaders from the Soviet Union and foreign nations continue to denounce Albania for its pro-Stalinist tendencies. (See also *China*.)

Oct. 21—A broadcast by the Tirana (Albania) radio last night is reported. The broadcast carried a statement by the Central Committee of the Albanian Communist party accusing Khrushchev of "anti-Marxist" actions.

Oct. 23—The Soviet Union detonates a 30-50 megaton nuclear bomb, according to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission's announcement.

Marshal Rodion Y. Malinovsky tells the congress that the Soviet Union has successfully solved the problem "of destroying missiles in flight."

Oct. 26—Khrushchev, in a reply to Ghana President Kwame Nkrumah's plea to end nuclear tests, declares that the U.S.S.R. was forced to resume nuclear testing to defend itself against the aggressive West.

Oct. 27—Khrushchev tells the Chinese Communists that they could reconcile the Communist bloc with Albania if they could reform Albania's leaders. He continues to criticize the Albanian government.

The U.N. General Assembly, voting 87 to 11, approves a resolution urging the U.S.S.R. to cancel its plans to test a 50-megaton bomb.

Oct. 28—The new statutes to regulate the Soviet Communist party's organization are presented to the 22nd congress.

Oct. 29—The U.S.S.R. announces that it has completed its rocket tests in the Central Pacific with a 7,500-mile dummy nose cone shot.

Khrushchev unveils the first monument to Karl Marx to be situated in Moscow.

Oct. 30—The Soviet Union announces that the body of Joseph Stalin will be removed from the mausoleum in Red Square where it lies beside V. I. Lenin's body. The re-

removal of Stalin's body is approved by the 22nd party congress.

The Soviet Union asks Finland for joint consultations on protecting their frontiers from Western military attack.

A huge Soviet nuclear explosion is detonated. The U.S. White House announces the explosion was a 50-megaton blast.

Oct. 31—The Soviet Union detonates 2 more nuclear blasts.

In Moscow it is reported that Khrushchev has told a closed meeting of the Communist party that the blast yesterday exceeded 50 megatons.

Since the Soviet Union resumed testing on September 1, the U.S. has reported 28 Soviet nuclear tests.

At the final meeting of the 22nd party congress, Khrushchev is re-elected to the presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist party. Frol R. Kozlov retains his place as second in command. The new Presidium is composed of 11 full members and 5 alternates.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Oct. 1—It is announced in Cairo that President Nasser is terminating diplomatic ties with Jordan and Turkey, the first to recognize the secessionist Syrian regime.

Oct. 21—Interior Minister Zakaria Modiedine declares that some 40 persons have been arrested as "political suspects"; and some 167 persons' property has been confiscated.

Oct. 31—*Al Ahram* (Egyptian newspaper) announces that the properties of an additional 255 persons have been "sequestered" from wealthy families and will be re-distributed among the peasants.

UNITED STATES

Agriculture

Oct. 4—The President signs a law restricting the recruiting of Mexican farm laborers; regulations urged by the Administration are not included in the law.

Oct. 9—The Agriculture Department revises upward its estimate of the 1961 cotton crop: the production of 14,334,000 bales of 500 pounds gross weight is foreseen.

Oct. 10—The Department of Agriculture reports that the estimated volume of 1961 crops is nearly one per cent higher than the estimate prepared last month, because of favorable weather, but 3.3 per cent be-

low the 1960 record. Estimated livestock feed grains production is expected to fall about 11 per cent under 1960, because of the Administration's acreage cuts.

Oct. 12—The Agriculture Department announces that the 1962 crop cotton acreage allotment will be cut 1.9 per cent.

Civil Rights

Oct. 3—It is revealed in Washington that the Federal Home Loan Bank Board has adopted a policy against racial discrimination in mortgage lending by 2,700 savings and loan associations under its supervision. These associations provide the largest single source of mortgage financing for private home construction in the United States.

Oct. 4—The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People names Jack Greenberg, a white lawyer, to succeed Thurgood Marshall as general counsel of the N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense Fund.

Oct. 5—In a 195-page report, the Civil Rights Commission asks the President to forbid by executive order racial discrimination in federally-aided housing and by federally supervised mortgage lenders.

Oct. 13—The Civil Rights Commission asks Congress to ban racial discrimination by labor unions.

Oct. 16—The Department of Justice files two suits accusing Plaquemines Parish County, Louisiana, and Panola County, Mississippi, of racial discrimination against Negro would-be voters.

Oct. 20—New York State's English-language literacy test for voters is held not to be a violation of the constitution by a 3-judge federal statutory court.

The Economy

Oct. 3—The Department of Labor reports that in September nonagricultural employment reached a record 61,372,000; the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate remained near 7 per cent for the eleventh month.

Oct. 17—Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon says the Administration plans to submit a balanced budget for 1963, in an address to the American Bankers Association.

Oct. 29—An official midyear review made by the Bureau of the Budget estimates the 1961-1962 budget deficit at \$6.9 billion.

Oct. 30—The Department of Labor reports that unemployment declined in 10 major labor markets during October.

Foreign Policy

(See also *International, Berlin Crisis.*)

Oct. 2—Ghana's President Kwame Nkrumah asks President Kennedy to decide by October 13 whether or not the U.S. will aid the Volta River project.

Oct. 4—Sudan's President Ibrahim Abboud is welcomed by President Kennedy, who entertains his guest at the White House with excerpts from Shakespeare's plays performed by actors of the American Shakespeare Festival at Stratford, Conn.

Oct. 6—Kennedy confers with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko.

Oct. 7—It is reported in Washington that the Kennedy-Gromyko talks made no progress.

Oct. 11—At a news conference, Kennedy says recipients of foreign aid need not agree wholeheartedly with the U.S.; the recipients' desire to maintain independence is the first criterion for U.S. foreign aid.

Oct. 12—Kennedy says that most Americans will live all their lives "in uncertainty and challenge and peril." He asserts that "We shall be neither Red nor dead but alive and free. . . ."

Oct. 14—Kennedy asks General Maxwell D. Taylor to study the general problems of Southeast Asia on his mission to South Vietnam.

Oct. 16—Kennedy confers with Finnish President Urho K. Kekkonen.

Oct. 17—Livingston T. Merchant, U.S. Ambassador to Canada, is appointed the President's personal representative to try to mediate the Pakistan-Afghanistan border dispute.

Oct. 20—Merchant arrives in Pakistan to discuss the Pakistan-Afghanistan border dispute.

Oct. 25—The Prime Minister of British Guiana, Cheddi B. Jagan, talks to President Kennedy about Guiana's request for foreign aid and about his "active neutralism."

Oct. 26—U.S. Ambassador to Russia Llewellyn E. Thompson is instructed to protest formally against East German interference with the authority of American

officials to enter East Berlin without restraint.

Oct. 30—The U.S. protests the Russian 50-megaton bomb explosion as an action planned to increase "fright and panic in the cold war."

Government

Oct. 2—The Department of Justice files a plan with the U.S. District Court in Chicago for the disposal of General Motors stock now held by E. I. du Pont de Nemours. According to a Supreme Court decision, the stock must be disposed of within 10 years.

Oct. 3—Kennedy vetoes a bill providing a pay increase for 560,000 postal workers.

Kennedy signs a two-year bill providing \$900 million to continue two school aid programs. The National Defense Education Act is extended to promote the teaching of mathematics, science and foreign languages, by means of federal loans to college students, fellowships, teachers' institutes and other devices. Aid to "impacted areas," with large concentrations of federal civilian or military personnel, is to continue. Kennedy terms this "an unsound and uneconomical measure."

Oct. 5—It is revealed that Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn has inoperable cancer.

Oct. 15—Because of disparaging remarks about Nigeria written by a Peace Corps member, Nigerian students demand the removal of Peace Corps personnel from Nigeria.

Oct. 26—President Kennedy orders federal agency heads to "follow a most careful and frugal policy" and to cut expenditures to a minimum.

Eva B. Adams becomes director of the United States Mint. Authority over silver policy has been transferred from her office to the Under Secretary of the Treasury.

Oct. 29—President Kennedy addresses 25,000 people in Big Cedar, Oklahoma, at the opening of the Ouachita National Forest Road.

Oct. 31—Ben D. Dorfman is named to the Tariff Commission for the second time; his first appointment was held up by the Senate Finance Committee.

Labor

Oct. 3—A nation-wide strike against the Ford Motor Company is ordered by the

United Automobile Workers of America. Oct. 10—Voting 24 to 3, the executive council of the C.I.O.-A.F.L. rules against admitting the International Brotherhood of Teamsters.

Oct. 11—The U.A.W. and the Ford Motor Company come to a 3-year national agreement.

Oct. 12—The C.I.O.-A.F.L. executive council declares that A. Philip Randolph, its Negro vice-president, is responsible for "the gap that has developed between organized labor and the Negro community." Randolph is president of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters; last June he charged discrimination in several C.I.O.-A.F.L. affiliates.

Oct. 15—The U.A.W. ends strikes in all except two Ford Motor plants.

Oct. 24—A milk truck drivers and plant workers strike begins in New York.

Oct. 30—The Southern Pacific Railroad and the Order of Railroad Telegraphers negotiate a contract guaranteeing a job or equivalent pay to every worker during his lifetime.

Military Policy

Oct. 3—The U.S. announces that 4 Air Force bases in Britain will not be closed as planned because of the Berlin crisis.

Oct. 5—Robert S. McNamara prohibits civilian and military defense officials from discussing politically partisan views at non-governmental meetings.

Oct. 6—John J. McCloy resigns as the President's adviser on disarmament and arms control; he says his mission is completed. President Kennedy underlines the importance of providing "fall-out protection for every American as rapidly as possible."

Oct. 11—The Department of Defense reveals that U.S. forces in Europe will be increased by about 10,000, in addition to the 40,000 already ordered overseas because of the Berlin crisis.

The X-15 rocket plane flies at a record altitude for winged, man-controlled flight, 215,000 feet.

Kennedy reveals in a news conference that the U.S. is considering the necessity for resumption of nuclear tests in the atmosphere.

Oct. 15—For 12 hours, all non-military aircraft in the U.S. and Canada are

grounded while maneuvers test continental defenses.

Oct. 17—The X-15 rocket plane sets a new speed record, flying at 3,920 miles an hour.

Oct. 19—Adlai Stevenson, U.S. representative at the U.N., tells the Political Committee of the General Assembly that unless a treaty forbidding tests is signed, the U.S. will in self-protection resume nuclear tests in the atmosphere shortly.

Oct. 21—An Air Force project (known as Project West Ford) orbits a Midas IV early warning satellite, with 350 million copper wires that will form a copper wire belt almost 2,100 miles above the earth. Astronomers and other scientists in the United States and abroad have criticized the project, fearing that the belt will interfere with scientific observations.

Oct. 27—An 8-engine Saturn rocket is fired successfully.

The Defense Department reveals that B-52 bomber production will terminate in 1962.

The aircraft carrier Constellation, the world's largest fighting ship, is commissioned at the Brooklyn Naval Shipyard.

Politics

Oct. 4—Former California Governor Goodwin J. Knight claims that the President of the California Savings and Loan Association on behalf of Richard Nixon offered him "any job in California" to stay out of the 1962 gubernatorial race.

Oct. 5—A similar charge is leveled at former Governor Knight by an aide of Nixon's.

Oct. 17—Former President Eisenhower campaigns in New Jersey for Republican candidate for Governor James P. Mitchell.

Oct. 24—Eisenhower appears in New York City to support Attorney General Louis J. Lefkowitz, Republican candidate for mayor.

Oct. 26—Nixon again says he will not be a candidate for the presidential nomination in 1964.

Oct. 27—Kennedy supports New York's Mayor Robert Wagner for re-election.

The White House announces that Kennedy will support the Democratic candidate for New Jersey's governorship, Richard J. Hughes, by making a campaign speech for Hughes in Trenton.

Oct. 30—Nixon says Rockefeller should actively compete in state primaries in 1964 in order to prove himself the strongest presidential candidate; Nixon will not compete in any 1964 primaries.

Segregation

Oct. 3—13 Negroes are admitted to first grade classes in white schools in Memphis, Tennessee, in voluntary, token desegregation.

Oct. 10—*Southern School News* reports that in the fall of 1961, 31 more Southern school districts desegregated, with a total of 392 Negroes. Alabama, Mississippi and South Carolina have not begun to desegregate.

Oct. 16—Attorney General Robert Kennedy announces that the Illinois Central, the Southern and the Louisville and Nashville railroads have agreed to desegregate their terminal facilities.

Oct. 23—Full desegregation of all schools in Lebanon and Wilson Counties, Tennessee, by January, 1962, is ordered by a federal district court.

Oct. 25—Complying with an Interstate Commerce Commission ruling to desegregate interstate bus terminal facilities, segregation signs are painted over in McComb, Mississippi; city authorities set up sidewalk signs at once directing Negroes and whites to different waiting rooms.

Oct. 31—The Department of Justice files suit in Oxford, Mississippi, to enjoin state and local law enforcement officials from enforcing state segregation laws in bus or railroad transportation.

Supreme Court

Oct. 2—A new Court session opens, with more than a thousand cases on its docket.

Oct. 9—Solicitor General Archibald Cox asks the Supreme Court to urge the states to reapportion state legislative districts, in a case involving Tennessee.

Oct. 23—The Court directs lower federal courts to hear a case brought by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People in Alabama. The N.A.A.C.P. is protesting an Alabama state ruling preventing it from doing business in that state.

VIETNAM, SOUTH

Oct. 2—President Ngo Dinh Diem declares that the war with Communist guerrillas

has grown into a "real war waged by an enemy who attacks us with regular units fully and heavily equipped."

Oct. 7—The South Vietnam government reports that 171 of its troops and 374 guerrillas have been killed between September 20 and October 4.

Oct. 11—President Kennedy announces that his military representative, General Maxwell D. Taylor, will go to South Vietnam shortly.

Oct. 12—The Moscow radio broadcasts a warning that any U.S. troops sent to Vietnam would violate the 1954 Geneva agreement on Indochina.

Oct. 21—General Taylor and his aides inspect the South-North Vietnam border area.

Oct. 24—South Vietnam presents the International Control Commission with a 16-page documented statement of North Vietnamese aggression.

General Taylor and President Ngo Dinh Diem confer on U.S. assistance in routing North Vietnamese Communist guerrillas.

Oct. 25—General Taylor leaves Vietnam for Thailand.

Oct. 26—The U.S. White House makes public a message sent earlier this week to President Ngo from President Kennedy. Kennedy's message affirmed the U.S. intent to help South Vietnam continue its fight against aggression from North Vietnam.

YUGOSLAVIA (See also *Sweden*.)

Oct. 14—The Yugoslav government, noting several articles in American newspapers criticizing Yugoslavia, asks U.S. Ambassador George Kennan for an official statement on U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia.

ERRATUM

The editors regret that an error appeared in "The Month in Review" in the November issue. Under *U.S. Government*, item of September 27, page 319, right column, line 43, should read: "The total appropriation voted by the first session of the eighty-seventh Congress is a record \$95.8 billion." We suggest that all subscribers make this correction in their November, 1961, copies.

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